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

The Ecclesiastical Review

A Monthly Publication for the Clergy

Cum Approbatione Superiorum

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

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THE

ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW

TENTH SERIES.—VOL. VIII.—(XCVIII).—MAY, 1938.—No. 5.

A NEW CONCEPT OF GRACE AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

THE NAME of Father de la Taille is associated with numerous original and profound studies on the Eucharist, among which his *Mysterium Fidei* stands out as a monumental achievement. He refers in the latter to a forthcoming work on grace,[1] which was never published because of his untimely death on 23 October, 1933. Fortunately his views on grace and the supernatural are not altogether lost and we can get some idea of what they were from Elucidatio XLI of *Mysterium Fidei,* from an article entitled "Actuation Créée par Acte Incréé" in *Recherches de Science Religieuse*[2] and from "Entretien Amical d'Eudoxe et de Palamède" in *Revue Apologétique.*[3]

Since the days of the Reformation and the Council of Trent the study of grace has become more and more complex and difficult. The emphasis has been shifted from sanctifying grace, with grace as a *motus quidam animae* in the background,—the standpoint of St. Thomas—to the problems of actual grace, especially the reconciliation of grace with the freedom of the will. Due to the exigencies of the controversies with the Reformers and the Jansenists the divisions of grace have been multiplied and *gratia excitans* and *adjuvans, gratia sufficiens* and *efficax* assume an almost disproportionate place in the study of the economy of salvation. It may well be questioned however, whether our understanding of what grace really is has grown apace with these increasing refinements and subtleties. Molinist still disputes with Thomist over the nature of actual grace.

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[1] P. 6 note 2 (con't.).

[2] Vol. 18, 1928, pp. 253-268.

[3] Vol. 48, pp. 5-26, 129-145.

Even in regard to sanctifying grace, where there is little or no dispute as to its nature, can we be said to know exactly what it is? Too often are we content to fit it into its proper category—it is not a substance, complete or incomplete, nor can it be any accident except quality, and as such it inheres in the soul as a habit—as if nothing more need be said. Is this the last word, however? Does this explanation or rather description give us a precise notion of what it is in itself?

One of the principal effects of sanctifying grace is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the Uncreated Grace, in the souls of the just. Here again we meet with difficulties when we attempt to explain what we mean by this indwelling and how it takes place. St. Thomas in the *Summ. Theol.* 1, 43, 3 tells us that God is present in the souls of the just " sicut cognitum in cognoscente et amatum in amante," and many take this statement as if it were the final explanation of that mysterious indwelling. Love postulates a real union, and divine love, stronger than human love, not only postulates it but produces it. Likewise to the intellect grace gives the gift of wisdom, a quasi-experimental knowledge and relish of God which implies a certain real presence of the one so relished within the soul.

Are these arguments conclusive? Hugon, whose Thomism is certainly above suspicion, candidly admits that not all theologians see the force of the argument from the gift of wisdom, though he himself adopts it.[4] Love postulates a real union indeed, but it actually produces only an affective or moral union and knowledge, even when it is quasi-experimental, causes an intentional but not a substantial presence of the one so loved and so relished. Van Der Meersch states that the possession of God by supernatural love and knowledge is of the intentional order.[5] Now the intentional presence of an object within us may be the highest form of union we can have with that object, but at the same time it is not the substantial presence, the presence of the very object itself within the subject, that is implied when we are told that God " will take up His abode " in the souls of those who love Him.

Finally, there does not seem to be enough room in the Grace Tract for all that goes under the name of grace. The *Lumen*

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[4] *De Gratia,* p. 174.

[5] *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique,* art. " Grace ", vol. 6, col. 1615.

Gloriae and the Hypostatic Union are both called graces, yet in the separate treatment that they receive it is hard to see what they have in common with actual or sanctifying grace. Is it not possible that we have been going the way of analysis so far that we have lost sight of the field of grace as a whole? What we need is a synthetic view that will reveal the principle of unity linking up the various ramifications of the term grace and exposing just what it is that lies at the heart of the supernatural.

To the credit of Father de la Taille it must be said that he has made an effort in this direction. It is a pity that his work on grace never saw the light. But from the little we have we can acquire a notion of grace and the supernatural that puts into clear light the common element instead of stressing differences. Only in this sense does he give us a new concept; but it is a concept that is sufficiently rare to justify a summary, though inadequate, presentation of it to the readers of these pages.

I

When a person receives grace he receives an actuation from God. Immediately the objection is raised: How can God, the infinite Being, become the act of any creature? Father de la Taille replies by showing the analogous character of actuation, and this may be regarded as the principle upon which his explanation of grace and the supernatural rests. What does he understand then by actuation?

Whenever an existing being has a perfection we say it is in act in regard to that perfection. For this reason God, who *is* all His perfections, is always in act. A creature however may not now have a perfection that he will have later: he is in potency toward it. Act and potency are not to be conceived at two beings but rather as two principles of being: by act the subject participates in a perfection, while by potency the subject is receptive of that act only in a limited way, because any being that can receive a perfection is necessarily finite. It is the function of the efficient cause to actuate the subject by reducing this potency to act. In the language of Father de la Taille, actuation means a union between the act and the subjective potency. It implies on the one hand a communication of the act to the potency and on the other a reception of the act by the potency.

The potency means the subject that is receptive and the act means the perfection that the subject is about to receive. The relation between act and potency in actuation is not one of efficiency, however necessary the efficient cause may be, but simply one of union. The union is not generated or produced: it is rather to be conceived as a gift of itself on the part of the act to the subjective potency. The union is also immediate because nothing stands between the act and the potency to link them together.

There is however a great difference between actuation by a finite act and the actuation of a creature by the infinite Act. If the finite act gives, it also receives. It receives not a perfection—the subject in potency receives that—but support; the act depends upon the subject (or potency) in some way or other. The animal soul actuates the beast's body and gives it life, but at the same time that soul depends for its existence upon the body it actuates. Even the human soul needs the body for the completion and integration of its powers. In all these cases where the act receives as well as gives, the actuation is called information. In material things the act is form, giving existence, and the potency is matter, receiving existence. The subject receives existence from the form, but in turn it supports the form and limits it.

In the natural order all actuation is information. Is it possible to have actuation without information? It is, when it is the uncreated Act that gives Itself to a finite potency. The reason is plain: it is impossible for the uncreated Act to be sustained or to depend in any way upon a creature. While It gives Itself, It can receive nothing in return. Never therefore can the relation of matter and form exist between God and His creatures. He can nevertheless actuate them without suffering any of the limitations that a finite act must suffer when it actuates its correlative potency. Then we have actuation without information. However, something must take place in the subject before such actuation can be realized.

When a finite potency is actuated by the infinite Act it is receiving something altogether above its natural capacity. An actuation of this kind would be altogether impossible unless something first happened to the subpect to enable it to receive the Act. St. Thomas in *Cont. Gent.* 3, 53 tells us that nothing can receive a higher form unless it is first elevated to the capacity required to receive this form. This elevation takes place by means of a disposition or adaptation that must be introduced into the subject before the form is received. Whenever therefore the uncreated Act wishes to actuate a creature, It will first elevate, adapt and dispose the creature to receive Itself as a higher Form. This adaptation as a work *ad extra* is caused efficiently by the Blessed Trinity. It is a created something, infused into the subject and not to be confused with either the Act or the subject. It truly informs the subject and adapts it for an immediate union with the uncreated Act. The union is immediate because this disposition is not an *ens quod* but an *ens quo*. The disposition can be called a created actuation because it is not educed from the subject but infused into it from above, from the uncreated Act. It performs a twofold function: toward the Act, it enables the subject merely to receive It without giving It support in any way; toward the subject that it forms, it enables it at least remotely to put forth acts that are conducive to the Act with which it is in immediate union.

This created disposition, adaptation or actuation is not an end in itself. It is the union of the Act with the subject that is the goal to which everything else leads; and since a union of this kind is altogether undue to any creature, are we not justified in seeing in it the essence of the supernatural? If the supernatural is at all possible it would seem to involve: 1. the elevation and adaptation of the subject by means of a created disposition or actuation divinely infused; 2. the giving of the Act Itself to the subject without informing it; 3. the reception of the Act by the subject without supporting It; 4. the immediate union of the Act with the subject that results therefrom.

II

The hypothesis of created actuation by the uncreated Act, implying the possibility of actuation that is not information, has been verified according to Father de la Taille in three cases. When the uncreated Act of Intelligibility, of Life and of Being united Itself as such to a creature, then we have verified in time actuation on the part of God that is not information and the supernatural becomes fact.

1. We have been promised to see God as He is: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God";[6] "We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face";[7] "We know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is."[8]

All knowledge is actuation. When we see or know an object on earth, we are in immediate contact with reality, but by means of a finite actuation called the *species expressa.* That which serves as the act to bring about this actuation is the *speciec impressa* or *infusa.* Because the *species expressa* or concept is not an *ens quod* but an *ens quo,* it puts us in direct contact with reality. In the Beatific Vision however, since no finite species or intelligible image can ever represent God as He is in Himself, God Himself takes the place of a created image and actuates the intellect of the creature to enable it to see Him as He is. But how can the finite receive the infinite and be in immediate union and contact with it?

St. Thomas is clear: nothing can receive a higher form except on condition that it first be elevated to the capacity required to receive that form. The divine essence is a form higher than every created intelligence. The created intelligence therefore must first be elevated and thus adapted to receive this form. The adaptation cannot consist of an increase in the native powers of the intellect, since the finite, no matter how much its powers are increased, can never equal the infinite. Yet there must be an increase. The only way in which it is possible is by the addition of a new form or disposition to the intellect caused by the Act Itself; it is a finite actuation caused by the infinite Act. This disposition serves a double purpose: it prepares the intelligence for an immediate union with God and enables it to receive the uncreated Act without sustaining It in any way; and then, once the union is effected, it disposes the intellect it informs for the vital operation that constitutes the vision.[9]

This disposition or adaptation we call the *Lumen Gloriae.* In itself it is neither the Act nor the intellect but a finite actuation introduced by the Act into the intellect before it can be immediately united with God and enjoy the Beatific Vision. It is an accidental form or grace through which we become deiform and share in the divine nature. Sharing in the divine nature in the full sense of the term means the Beatific Vision for in this Vision the soul takes part in the intellectual life of God. It sees Him and loves Him as God sees and loves Himself, directly and immediately and without the intervention of any created species. This would be impossible were it not for the strengthening of its intellectual powers by the created grace or disposition we call the *Lumen Gloriae.* The entire supernatural order has no meaning for us unless it leads to this as its goal.

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[6] Mt. 5:8.

[7] 1 Cor. 13:12.

[8] 1 Jn. 3:2.

[9] *Cont. Gent.,* 3, 53.

2. A goal implies a movement toward it by the one who has attained it. Even in this life we move toward the object of the Vision by charity—and charity, to be truly love of God above all things, needs a previous knowledge of the beatitude it strives to attain. This implies friendship with God while we are still on the way toward Him, and friendship in turn implies a certain community of life whereby one regards his friend as his other self. We must know God and love Him not in any way at all, but as a friend knows his friend and a son loves his father; and only then shall we be heirs of the Kingdom that was prepared from the beginning for them that love Him. This means that our state must be changed: we must be reborn before we can enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Below the faculties of intellect and will is the essence of the soul, the principle of life, which must begin to live a new life, the life of a friend, a son and an heir, before it can enjoy eternal life in the Beatific Vision. Living its rational life the soul must receive an accidental increase of life from the uncreated Vital Principle. Although always accidental, this will be a higher form of life, for it will enable the soul to exercise functions that will terminate in the Beatific Vision.

Again, there is created actuation by the uncreated Act, communication of the Act to the subject and reception of the Act by the subject without supporting It in any way. Again there must be the addition of a created form or disposition to enable the subject to receive the uncreated Vital Act, and this disposition or perfection introduced by the Act into the soul is what we mean by sanctifying grace. As a created disposition it exists not for its own sake but solely for the sake of the union with the uncreated Act. It truly informs the soul however and serves as an active radical principle for the vital operations that lead to eternal life.

Sanctifying grace therefore may be called the created communication of the Spirit of Life to the essence of the soul, as the *Lumen Gloriae* is the created communication of the divine Intelligible Object to the intellect. Both are qualities that inform their proper subject and both constitute the immediate possession of the Act by their respective subjects. Each is an *ens quo* and not an *ens quod;* hence St. Thomas could say " . . . per gratiam efficimur ipsi Deo conjuncti, et non mediante aliqua creatura ".[10] Both these actuations mean that God dwells within us: by grace, in the essence of the soul; by the *Lumen Gloriae,* in the intelligence of the Blessed. Likewise in both the actuation is habitual—that is, accidental yet permanent.

What more is needed to explain the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just? If by grace there is an immediate and permanent, though accidental, union of the soul with the uncreated Act of Life (the Blessed Trinity, but the Holy Spirit by appropriation), and if the actuation means the giving of the Act to the subject and the possession of the Act by the subject, what more need be said? St. Thomas asserts that the giving of the Holy Spirit means not merely a new relation of the creature to God but the actual possession of God by the one to whom He is given.[11] In this indwelling there is a presence by communication, the communication of the uncreated Act of Life to the rational creature who is prepared to receive It by grace. Long before Father de la Taille, even long before St. Thomas, the same thought was tersely expressed by St. Basil: " When we understand the grace which operates in those who are partakers of it, then we say that the Spirit is in us ".[12]

3. The third instance of created actuation by the uncreated Act given by Father de la Taille is to be found in the Hypo-

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[10] 1 *D.* 14, 3.

[11] " . . . in processione Spiritus, secundum quod hic loquimur, prout scilicet claudit in se dationem Spiritus Sancti, non sufficit quod sit nova relatio, qualiscumque est, creaturae ad Deum; sed oportet quod referatur in ipsum sicut ad habitum: quia quod datur alicui habetur aliquo modo ab eo " (1 *D.* 14, 2, 2, ad 2).

[12] *ὅταν δὲ εἰς τοὺς μετόχους ἐνεργουμένην χάριν ἐνθυμηθῶμεν, ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι* Πνεῦμα *λέγομεν* (*De Spiritu Sancto,* 26, 63; PG 32, 184).

static Union, although he met with a great deal of opposition over this application of his view.

In the Incarnation the Verbum and the human nature of Christ form a substantial unity since there is but one substantial existence, the existence of the Verbum. The Verbum is the Act that substantially actuates this human nature, making it share the same act of existence that is identified with the Verbum. There must then be a communication of the Verbum as the uncreated Act of Being to that human nature and a corresponding reception of that Act in the human nature of Christ. St. Thomas in *Cont. Gent.* 3, 53 teaches that a union of two terms once separate requires a change in at least one of them, especially where the union consists in the reception of a higher form. No change can take place in God; it is evident then that all the change must be found in the human nature assumed by the Verbum. This change in the human nature adapting it for the union is called by Father de la Taille with the utmost consistency a created actuation or a created grace.

It is a created grace because it is an adaptation, disposition or perfection that enables the human nature to receive an act of existence for which it has no natural capacity. It differs however from the other two dispositions we have been considering in this respect: it is not habitual or accidental but of the substantial order. This does not mean that it is a substance or part of a substance, any more than the substantial existence of a creature is a substance or part of a substance although it substantially actuates the creature. Our existence is accidental in the logical, not in the predicamental sense; that is, in the sense that it is not essential to a finite being to exist. Our existence is also substantial simply because it is the actuation of the potency in our essence to be a substance. For the same reason the actuation of the human nature of Christ, elevating and disposing it to be one substance with the Verbum, must be called substantial and not accidental in the order of reality. It is something efficiently caused by the Trinity that enables the human nature to exist in and by the existence of the Verbum as one substance with It and not merely joined to It in an accidental fashion.

In this actuation, as in the others, the Verbum does not inform the humanity of Christ but merely communicates Himself to it as the substantial Act of Being by taking it into His own existence. That which is given is the uncreated, eternal Act—the divine existence of the Verbum, one with the divine nature. In the human nature there is a temporal and created actuation that will last as long as the union will last but which would cease if the union were ever dissolved, which we know will never take place. Father de la Taille claims that this created actuation is nothing more than the change mentioned by St. Thomas in the *Summ. Theol.* 3, 2, 7 as having taken place in the human nature of Christ, and even called a grace in article 10 of the same question, where the Angelic Doctor is careful to distinguish it from habitual grace. In the *Commentary on the Sentences,* 3, D.5, 1, 1, qcl.1, there is reference to a change in the human nature when it was drawn into unity with the divine person, and Cajetan speaks of this change as an actuation or perfection of the humanity of Christ that is far superior to the actuation it would have received from its own *esse.*[13] Finally, this created actuation may be all St. Thomas had in mind when in *De Unione Verbi Incarnati,* art. 4, he speaks of two existences in Christ, while in the *Summa Theol.,* 3, 17, 2, he admits only one. If existence is taken to mean *actuation,* then there were two—the uncreated, eternal actuation of the Verbum, one with the divine nature, and the temporal, created actuation of the human nature by the Verbum. If existence however means the *act* whereby the two natures exist, then there was only one, the divine existence of the Verbum.

We are dealing with highly disputed matter and many do not understand what is meant by a disposition that is not accidental but of the substantial order. At the same time the view of Father de la Taille is not without supporters in past ages as well as in present. Whatever we may think of his concept of the grace of the Union, his grasp of the supernatural is firm and clear. For him the supernatural consists of an undue communication of the uncreated Act to a creature terminating in an immediate union between the two. Precisely because the union is altogether undue there is need of an elevation and adaptation of the creature as a preliminary requisite. Hence, the presence of God by operation, causing this adaptation, is necessarily presupposed to His presence by communication, but it is in presence by communication that the supernatural essentially consists. The union involves no information on the part of the Act nor any support given to the Act by the creature who receives It. Grace is always the created actuation caused by the uncreated Act in the subject, elevating it and adapting it for immediate union with God and disposing it, once the union is effected, to operate in harmony with Him. Apart from that union it has no meaning.

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[13] In 3, 17, 2.

III

In the writings we have reviewed Father de la Taille did not apply his concept of grace and the supernatural to actual grace. There seems to be no reason however why this cannot be done. St. Thomas, while not using the term " actual grace," yet speaks of a gratuitous effect of God's will that is not a quality (sanctifying grace) but a " motus quidam animae " that operates after the manner of an efficient and not a formal cause.[14] Is this " motus animae " the very indeliberate act of the intellect and will, as Molinists maintain, or is it rather a previous motion of some sort that stirs up that indeliberate act, as Thomists generally believe?

If the views of Father de la Taille are correct, then we must be prepared to find analogous formal causality even in actual grace to explain how the act is supernatural. That God is the efficient cause of immediate illuminations in the intellect and inspirations in the will no one denies. Why do we call those motions supernatural? Are they actual grace itself, or are they the effect of actual grace?

Let us apply the principles we have learned above to this case. If those acts are supernatural, there must be an immediate union between God and—not the action as such, which is wholly unintelligible—but the faculty that produces the action. The union is not a permanent one, as is the union through sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, but transient—it can take place even in the case of a sinner. There is again an altogether undue communication of the Act to the potencies, the faculties of intellect and will, without informing them and a corresponding reception of the Act by the potencies without sustaining It in any way. Again, the faculty as a passive potency must be perpared for this transient union by a disposition that elevates it and puts it, let us not hesitate to say so, in immediate though transient union with God. Does this mean that a man in mortal sin when he receives an actual grace is in an immediate contact with God? With the qualification that the contact is a transient one, the answer is an emphatic yes. What else do the inspired words mean when they say: "Behold, *I* stand at the gate and knock "[15] and "It is *God* who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will " ?[16]

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[14] *Summa Theol.* 1-2, 110, 2, corp. and ad 1.

Actual grace accordingly is the created actuation that transiently supernaturalizes the faculties by elevating them and adapting them for a passing visit from the uncreated Act. But why has God paid them this passing visit? Solely because He wishes to move them toward a definite objective that will ultimately lead to salvation. God Himself does not move, but He can instigate movement in His creatures; and wherever He operates, there He must of necessity be. Since it is a Moving Being—not moving in Himself but only as far as we are concerned—that is in immediate union with the faculties under actual grace, this created disposition, while fulfilling its passive function of adapting the faculties for that union, at once assumes a more active rôle and communicates to the faculties in a finite way the movement intended by the infinite Act. The movement that arises in the faculties is the indeliberate act, which can truly be said to be caused immediately by God since the active disposition, actual grace, that initiated it is not an *ens quod* but an *ens quo,* just as sanctifying grace as an *ens quo* immediately unites the soul to God. Actual grace therefore as a passive disposition transiently supernaturalizes the faculties by putting them in immediate contact with God, and in this respect it acts after the manner of a formal cause—only analogously, however, since there is actuation without information and reception of the Act without giving It support. As an active disposition actual grace acts efficiently, transmitting movement to the intellect and will from the infinite Mover.

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[15] Apoc. 3:20.

[16] Phil. 2:13.

It is necessary to place this active disposition in the faculties to enable them to be set in motion in a finite way, otherwise it is difficult to see how movement coming from an infinite source would be anything else than infinite. Actual grace therefore may be called the finite communication of movement from the infinite mover to the faculties, terminating in indeliberate acts which, if assented to and obeyed, will ultimately lead to salvation. God is the immediate efficient cause of these indeliberate acts since the disposition, actual grace, does not intervene as an *ens quod* between Himself and the faculty, but merely as an *ens quo.* Actual grace transiently and accidentally elevates the faculties and adapts them to receive the infinite Act. It then communicates to them movement from the infinite Mover. The indeliberate act is the result of actual grace rather than actual grace itself.

If God were directly united with the indeliberate act without this transient disposition and the indeliberate act thus supernaturalized were actual grace itself, then the infinite would be immediately united with the finite without any adaptation or change in the latter and God would become the act of a creature. This however is impossible without the previous adaptation and elevation insisted on by St. Thomas.

The supernatural therefore always means immediate union with God. The union may be permanent and accidental, as in the *Lumen Gloriae* and sanctifying grace; or permanent and substantial, as in the Hypostatic Union. Rigorously applying the same principles, there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the union may also be transitory and accidental, as in the case of actual grace. In all these cases (with the possible exception of the Hypostatic Union) there is need of a created actuation infused into the subject by the uncreated Act making the union possible and disposing the subject remotely or proximately for acts that are conducive to the union as their goal. That created actuation caused by the uncreated Act is what we mean by grace.

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PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE.

I.

A RAPID SURVEY of contemporary philosophies of life reveals the fact that at the present day there are three dominant conceptions of human life. Of these one must rank as ineffectual, not commanding any organized or consistent following. The other two are actually locked in struggle: the system of Jesus Christ represented by the Catholic Church, and the philosophy of Karl Marx which I shall designate as Bolshevism. For anyone acquainted with the literature of our day such a synoptic account imposes itself: it serves to classify the thinking of our contemporaries on the problem of man, his life and destiny.

To take them in order, the view of life which is ineffectual is one whose issue is doubt, negation, scepticism. Any system which ends in such despair is bound to be ineffectual: it has no Creed, no Cause, which will act as an inspiration for organized endeavor. The logical outcome of such a system is drift, and when men drift they experience no real ambition to remedy conditions or reconstruct the world, but are content to steal from life in passing moments some solace for life's lack of meaning. " The task of keeping afloat a partially wrecked hulk," writes Alfred Noyes, in his book, *The Unknown God,* " so closely engages a greater part of the population that we have come to look upon the steering-gear as the relic of a superstitious age."

That the tide of our contemporaries is swelling daily with those whose policy is drift, I am well aware. But their drifting is noiseless until they are arrested on their way by some alternative positive philosophy, something which seems to make it worth their while to stay their course. There are only two all-round, complete philosophies left at the moment which can boast any kind of universal or vital appeal: these are the philosophy of Christianity on the one hand, and that of Bolshevism on the other. Europe has been largely drifting out of Christianity since the Reformation. That being so, the alternative in the eyes of many is not to get back to Christ but to clutch at the only real alternative to hand. The attractiveness of that alternative is enhanced by an apparent measure of success in Russia, by the fanaticism of its exponents, by its optimistic hopes to reconstruct the world and make it more inhabitable for the mass of men. Such an alternative is poles apart from an ineffectual philosophy of despair which settles down in the conviction of life's futility and lack of purpose.

A large mass of our contemporaries, however, *has* fallen into this chaos of life's futility. The theory that life is meaningless and not worth living does mark an epoch in the history of human thought. To understand the advent of such a view we must look to history. There was a time in Europe when men in general had a definite philosophy of life: they had convictions and an outlook on the things that really mattered. The Christian Religion provided men with a sane and comprehensive world-system and the medieval world in all its output, whether in philosophy, art or literature, was guided by one fundamental aspiration. That outlook was systematized in the philosophy of St. Thomas, just as it had been already in the system of St. Augustine, and for centuries the Christian philosophy supplied the framework for men's thinking on the universe and life. Within that framework there was room for definite convictions on vital things and for difference of opinion on less important matters, but, in all, men had certain moral principles to guide them in the art of living, whether that art was individual or communal. It is true that men did not always live up to the principles of that philosophy, but at least there was a theoretical acceptance of such principles which prevented men from rushing into chaos. Even in the sixteenth century, when the framework of medieval philosophy was being smashed in the interests of Reformation, when men began to criticize the sterility of Thomistic ideals of life, when they began to show an interest much more keen in earth than in heaven, they did not bid good bye to sanity and declare life meaningless and not worth while. The presupposition of modern reflexion, as exemplified in the work of Lord Francis Bacon, was that life was possessed of meaning and had a definite goal.[1]

It is only in the nineteenth century that the typically modern approach to the problem makes its appearance for the first time in history. Instead of taking for granted, as heretofore, that life had meaning, men began to question this very assumption. The wording of the problem is new; and when H. W. Mallock, in the second half of the nineteenth century, wrote a book entitled *Is Life Worth Living?* he was expressing this new attitude of his contemporaries. Where Aquinas and Bacon, presupposing that life had a goal, had asked " What is the goal of life? " the thinkers of the nineteenth century began to ask: Has life any goal? The form of the question as asked by Mallock finds a thousand echoes in the literature of his period; and the two philosophical poems of the period, for instance, *Bishop Blougram's Apology* by Browning and Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, reveal their common preoccupation with the value of human life. They were succeeded by George Eliot, who simply drew the blinds and shut off the light of God:

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[1] See my book, *A Preface to Life*, pp. 116-128.

> Human time
> Shall fold its eyelids, and the human sky
> Be gathered like a scroll within the tomb
> Unread forever . . .

The transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century is a passing from doubt to dogmatic denial. Eucken could write, toward the close of the nineteenth century, that " it can hardly be denied that the man of to-day has no sure convictions about himself or the meaning of life." In our day, we might say, men are quite sure—it is in fact the only thing about which many are sure—that life is devoid of purpose or meaning. W. R. Gregg, in a book entitled *The Enigmas of Life*, which has run to twenty editions, tells us: " We must conclude that the problem of man's Where, Whence, Wherefore was meant to be insoluble." Mr. Bertrand Russell in an outburst of sceptical confidence blandly asserts: " That man is a product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving . . .: that all the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system. . . . All these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand." I like Mr. Russell's " if not quite beyond dispute ": it is a concession for which we are grateful.

When we inquire into the origins of this scepticism and denial we find them in a conception of life which seemed to be imposed by science (with a capital S) in the first half of the nineteenth century. The net result of this conception, the outcome of what has well been styled the Lyricism of Science, was to affirm that there was no room for purpose in the world, that man himself was merely the product of blind forces, that he was therefore nothing more than body and that he was doomed to entire extinction in the vast death of the solar system. Such a view found adherents in the sphere of theory, or in the comfort of their arm chair philosophy, who could go on living though convinced that life was not worth living. It also found opponents in the sphere of theory from the ranks of those who still believed in spiritual values. But when a state of things began gradually to emerge which was the result of science's application to civilization as a whole, when the medieval stock of religion was excluded from public life, when industry and its organization were left in the hands of the naked *homo economicus,* then the question of life's value entered the domain of practical politics. The state of things described by Pope Leo XIII as the reduction of the mass of workers to a state of serfdom little less than slavery itself turned men's practical minds to the question. For is life worth living for the worker who is treated as a mere tool and instrument of another's wealth; is life worth living when his elementary human rights are denied; is life worth living when he is by law forbidden to defend himself; is life worth living when the dignity of his personality is being wrested from him? These are questions that must have been uppermost in the minds of workers who had to suffer from a civilization where religion was excluded from public life and where science ruled.

We have a rather good picture of the times in these words of Pope Leo XIII which were written in 1891: "The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes, all are occupied with it—and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention." [2] The result was that those who believed anything about life had become social reformers. Amongst the number was Karl Marx. In conjunction with Friederich Engels, Marx raised up a social system which he considered to be firmly rooted in a true and scientific philosophy. His originality did not consist so much in new ideas as in the masterly way in which he coördinated those of his predecessors. Claiming that his own was scientific, he denounced as Utopian all previous theories. The authenticity of his claim may indeed be questioned, but at least he had the merit of boldly putting forward a philosophy which was positive and appealing. His philosophy appeared at a time when the minds of his contemporaries were chaotic and when external conditions were ripe for revolution. "These were years of tremendous disturbance," says a recent writer. "In England the hungry forties were the time of the Chartist Movement—that revolution which failed to come off; in France and Germany, Italy and Austria there were constant upsurges of discontent, and the growing insistence of the middle classes to share power with the upper class, which led to revolutions all over the Continent in the year 1848." But it was only in November, 1917, that the philosophy of Marx assumed external shape, when Lenin and a comparatively small revolutionary band took possession of the government of Russia. Russia made it evident that Marx was no mere academic doctrinaire but the expounder of a philosophy which was meant to be translated into action.

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[2] *Rerum Novarum.*

Professional Bolsheviks, however, do not confine their activities to Russia. They admit no national frontiers or racial differences, but are cosmopolitan in their outlook, following the dictum of their founders: "Working men of all countries, unite." [3] Russia, therefore, has become the headquarters of propaganda for the rest of the world and the strength of that propaganda lies precisely in the fact that Bolshevism claims to be a positive and complete philosophy of life. The first principle of that philosophy is the denial of religion as religion has been traditionally understood; and it is testimony to the fact that man is deeply religious that Bolshevism itself, because a complete philosophy, is undeniably religious after a fashion. For all Marxists pursue an ideal which they hope to see realized in a future Socialistic State. This inspiration permeates all their activities and since they are not less human than their fellows they draw on this inspiration for enthusiasm. Indeed, the certainty with which Marxism preaches the advent of perfect Communism raises the hopes of those condemned to the monotonous life of modern industry and reveals to them a cause and a mission. That is why it has inspired asceticism and self-sacrifice in its followers. For, " Marxism," says R. H. Murray, " is a religion and bears the usual signs. It has a creed and a sacred text. . . . Marxists have abjured other religions, especially Christianity. Mankind, however, is incurably religious, and when it parts with a creed in one form it speedily restores it in another. . . . They pursue an ideal . . . though they pursue it by exploiting the most sordid motives . . . and they must have some guide to cling to. . . ." In a word, there is a philosophy of life which is at the back of Bolshevism: its economic plan is merely part of a wider programme and is itself dictated by a philosophic theory which covers every aspect of life. " It is precisely in this respect," writes Gurian, " that Bolshevism is superior to the sceptical, relativist and purely opportunist political and social attitude so common in the outside world. It claims to represent immutable principles."

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[3] *The Communist Manifesto,* p. 39.

I shall be content, therefore, if I have made it clear that the relative superiority of Bolshevism over that philosophy which I have described as ineffectual lies in the fact that Bolshevism claims to be a complete philosophy of life. For, unlike the brute beast, man must have an outlook on life which colors all his thoughts and actions. He cannot afford to live from day to day without adopting some attitude to life, and when he pretends that he need have no attitude his pretension is itself an attitude—a cowardly one at that. That is why Bolshevism offers an alternative to all forms of scepticism and is superior to them in its appeal, because it expresses a definite attitude positively and directly. " It is true," writes Christopher Dawson, " that the Bolshevik philosophy is a poor thing at best. It is a philosophy reduced to its very lowest terms, a philosophy with a minimum of spiritual and intellectual content. . . . Nevertheless, it is enough of a philosophy to provide society with a theoretical basis, and therein lies the secret of its strength." [4] It follows that Bolshevism must stand or fall with its philosophy, and that in itself affords a solid ground on which the Christian philosophy may meet its opponents.

[4] *Enquiries into Religion and Culture*, p. 27.

II.

It is not my intention here to expound the secret philosophy of Bolshevism. Communists claim to be the inheritors of the true teaching of Karl Marx; yet the anarchists under Bakunin differed from the followers of Marx on important points of doctrine. Modern developments have tended to bring the two schools together, and under the Russian Bolsheviks, Communism is primarily concerned with the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, whilst anarchism enunciates the principles that will operate in society after the transition has been effected. The danger is that the common presentation of Marxism is liable to be one-sided. For the historian it is the method of interpreting history materialistically; for the political economist it connotes the labor theory of value and the consequent surplus-value as expounded in *Capital*. In reality what is ordinarily treated as Marxist theory is but a part of a much wider philosophical structure, a system that has a twofold source; for its materialistic content it is indebted to Feuerbach and for its dialectical method it depends on Hegel. Marx avowedly was a materialist, conscious that his system was "scientific" as compared with all other previous sociological views, which he regarded as Utopian.

Sufficient, however, has been said to show that the relevant philosophies of our day are the Christian philosophy of life and the materialistic philosophy of Bolshevism as opposed to the negative theories of the sceptics, who have no real system. But before an attempt is made to sketch the broad outlines of the Christian solution there is just one aspect of communistic propaganda that calls for mention. The Christian will accept the view that religion, in the last resort, must give meaning and purpose to life. Now religion is rejected by Communism. The relating of human life to God and to eternity for fulfilment is just what, according to the communist, condemns our present life to sheer ineptitude. According to Bolshevism, religion is the one essential bar to human progress. At the Sixth World Congress, held in Moscow in 1928, the following pronouncement was made: "Amongst the aims of the revolution, the fight against religion, the opium of the people, holds a special place: it must be pursued inflexibly and systematically. Hence it must be excluded from education, and every association that is Catholic must be ruled out."

Karl Marx coined this phrase, " the opium of the people," and everywhere you will find it on the banner of Bolshevism. I have tried sincerely to discover the reasons for this phrase from the writings of the communists, and what I have found may be summed up in the following points:

(1) Religion is a drug administered to the people by the priesthood. It has for effect the blinding of the people's eyes to their present conditions and tends to make them satisfied to live in hope of an eternal life which will be sufficient recompense for their present miseries. The result is that the so-called lower classes are held in resignation and their hands are powerless to modify their lot or reshape the conditions of their social life.

(2) Religion is the enemy of the working classes because it has contented itself with indicating only the rights of capital and property.

(3) Religion is an obstacle because its exponents are on the side of established order and never cease from emphasizing the duties of the workers and so have bound them to a lot the effect of which is to make human life not worth living.

In stating these objections I have endeavored to be fair, acting on the principle that we must love the communist while we hate his Communism. But it is also only just and fair to insist that Communism is by its very nature anti-religion, that it denies the very things that make religion possible—God, the human soul, a future life, the only things which for us make life worth living.

What is to be said of these objections? Is religion a drug? Notice that opium is a drug. The effect of taking it is to impair a man's natural use of reason. Now does religion so impair the use of reason? I reply, No. On the contrary, the Catholic Church, which for us is the living and infallible exponent of true religion, requires two things that imply essentially the use of man's natural reason. She accepts no convert to her faith, on the one hand, until he or she is convinced that it is reasonable to accept the Church as the true exponent of God's mind for man. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, is always inculcating on her children the necessity of being able to give reasons for the faith that is in them. For though she admits that there are certain mysteries which are beyond the power of reason fully to understand, she insists that no contradiction can ever vitiate her teaching. But any institution that appeals to reason for her acceptance and which demands the giving of reasons for this acceptance and for the faith that she teaches cannot truly be said to be administering a drug such as opium to remove the use of reason from her subjects.

What is to be said of religion in its effect on present conditions? Does it condemn us to blind ourselves in their regard and to think only of eternity? This is entirely to misunderstand the religious point of view. The Christian who believes in Providence does not commit himself to accepting everything as the will of God; he knows that he must coöperate with God and that therefore he has a temporal as well as an eternal mission. Only the fatalist accepts present conditions for what they are. The Christian knows that as a member of an earthly city he must coöperate for the common good, and that when the relations of justice have been fulfilled he must also bring the enthusiasm of charity to bear upon the situation. I need only cite the work of St. Vincent de Paul and of those who have imbibed his spirit to indicate what an influence for social good the Christian spirit may be. But, at least it will be said, belief in a future life must lessen a man's anxiety about the present life. If by that you mean that he does not work as if this life were the end of everything and that the goods of the earth were all he needed to make life worth while, then I concede. As a matter of fact, what is wrong with the world of to-day is that it is trying to make a heaven of earth. Now, that is not possible. It leads inevitably to trouble.

Those who try to possess the earth always discover that there is not enough to go round. And so there are wars and rumors of war. There is only one reality that all men can possess. That reality is not wealth, which is limited, nor land, which is also limited: it is God. The more men possess God the more peace will there be; for God, as it were, can be shared by all. But to say that those who strive to possess Him in this life are, therefore, indifferent to present social conditions, is to be want-ing in elementary psychology. No man could really love God and not want to make God's will for men, that is His desire for their ultimate happiness, come true—on earth as well as in heaven. The saint who said she would spend her heaven in doing good on earth was voicing the authentic wish of the soul enamored of God.

Finally, to the objection that the exponents of religion are for ever one-sidedly voicing the rights of capital and property and the duties of labor, I reply that that is not an objection: it is a lie. The Sovereign Pontiffs of the Catholic Church are the exponents of religion. Listen: "Working men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition . . . so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself." Was it Karl Marx who wrote these words No. It was Pope Leo XIII. Again, "Most helpful and worthy of all praise are the efforts of those who, in a spirit of harmony and with due regard for the traditions of the Church, seek to determine the precise nature of the duties of property, and to define the boundaries imposed by the requirements of social life upon the right of ownership itself or upon its use." Was it some modern propagandist of Bolshevism who penned these words? No. It was our beloved Pontiff, Pius XI. In a word, the present Holy Father, indicating the Catholic ideal of social readjustment, says: "Only a just share of the fruits of production should be allowed to accumulate in the hands of the wealthy and a just share should be given to the workingman. The purpose is not that they become slack at their work, for man is born to labor, as the bird to fly, but that by thrift they may increase their possessions, and by the prudent management of the same may be enabled to bear the family burden with greater ease and security, being freed from that hand-to-mouth uncertainty which is the lot of the proletarian. Thus they will not only be in a position to support life's changing fortunes, but will also have the reassuring confidence that, when their lives are ended, some little provision will remain for those whom they leave behind them. Unless serious attempts be made, with all energy and without delay, to put these principles into practice, let nobody persuade himself that the peace and tranquility of human society can be effectively defended against the forces of revolution." Having thus prepared the ground, by excluding the current objections against religion, we may safely see what is the true philosophy of human life as it has been elaborated for us by the great Christian thinkers. I shall first take up the question of life as it appears in the light of reason, and then I shall add a word on the specific contribution of Jesus Christ to the solution of the problem.

III.

There are three fundamental points in the Thomistic conception of human life. St. Thomas shows successively (1) that all human endeavors, of no matter what order, are dominated by a supreme object which he calls the ultimate end of human action: that supreme object he designates beatitude or happiness. (2) He then proves that his supreme object, the acquisition of which brings blessedness to man, is none other than God. (3) He concludes that the goal of life for man is necessarily the possession of God.

The starting-point of his philosophy of life is an elementary consideration which is accessible to everybody, that in all man's strivings he is seeking a something which explains them all. For were there not some fixed thing toward which we tend, the result would be that we should not be alive at all. There is not a single individual who is not seeking something, and all together they are in pursuit of happiness. In this Aquinas is at one with all the great thinkers of humanity, whether they are Christians or not. From Aristotle to St. Augustine, from Augustine to a modern prophet such as Tolstoi, men are profoundly agreed that the proper reading of life is that it is a quest for happiness. " For man," said St. Augustine, " has no other reason for philosophizing than that he may be happy; but that which makes men happy is itself the supreme good of life." Says Tolstoi: " Men cannot imagine life without the desire for happiness. To live is, for every man, the same thing as to desire and attain happiness; to desire and attain happiness is synonymous with living. . . . Life is a striving toward happiness. A striving toward happiness is life. Thus all men have understood, do understand, and always will understand." We may take that as proven, then.

The next point to settle is whither does this thirst for happiness lead us. What supreme object can confer on man the happiness which for him is life? St. Thomas has no difficulty in proving that God alone can confer happiness, that God is the anonymous object of all human desire. His arguments are drawn from the nature of man as a being endowed with such faculties as intellect and will. Here, then, is his proof in short. The supreme good of an appetitive faculty like that of will, which depends on intelligence, can only be the universal good. Now this universal good is not to be found in any created or finite object as such, nor yet in the sum of all finite good, which is still finite. Hence it is in God, and in God alone, that the human will must find its supreme good. Such an argument is simply an epitome of his whole psychology of intellect and will. For St. Thomas elsewhere shows that the object of such faculties is something by its very nature universal and unlimited. There is no limit to the amount of truth the human intellect is seeking and every progress for the human mind is simply proof that there is yet more to be known. But is it not the same with will? The object of will is simply the good in general, and that is why no finite good can exhaust its capacity or wrest from the will its freedom. Once this is granted, it is not difficult to see that no finite good can fill up man's capacities for happiness. St. Thomas then takes up some samples of finite objects, such as wealth and honor and power and glory and bodily health and the many other things that men and women pursue so avidly. But he comes to the conclusion that all of them, even taken together, are limited; they do not contain the universal good which man's will is seeking. Only God verifies the idea of the supreme good under every aspect, and whether man knows it or not, it is God he is seeking in all his spiritual hungers and thirsts.

St. Thomas, following St. Augustine, then narrows down the discussion to one simple alternative. When there is question of a supreme good for life, he argues, man must find it either in God or in his own self. "Wherefore," says St. Augustine, "while philosophers have sought the good of man from the mind or from the body, it is still only from man they have supposed it must be sought." For with marvellous shallowness, he says, our adversaries have sought blessedness of life in this earthly life and in themselves. Nor is this simplification a puerile one. For what is it that men seek in wealth and power and honor and such things but an enlargement of the self? Hence man is driven to look for happiness either from his poverty-stricken self or from the opulence of God, and St. Thomas hesitates not to conclude that only God can satisfy the cravings of the human spirit.

From this his third point follows. The goal of life is the possession of God. But what does the possession of God mean?

It is clear that for a being like man, capable of knowledge, love and contemplation, it must come from an intellectual possession of God, and not merely an intellectual possession only, but one in which man's whole being as capable of love and contemplation will be involved. For that purpose he concludes that in this life, if man is to choose the road which truly leads to God, his personality, by means of virtue which is the right ordering of his actions, must be truly consecrated to the pursuit of God. Only in this way can man ever hope to come to God.

One detail must be added. This possession of God demands a future life. St. Thomas concludes to immortality from the soul's desire of the supreme good. To account for man's human strivings in this life St. Thomas demands a future life. For if man's human strivings, after the true, the good and the beautiful, do not indicate an object in which these human values are realized, then man's life is meaningless: more, the universe itself is nothing better than a jest. Both will and intellect are insatiable for truth and goodness: the soul from which they spring is insatiable for the contemplation of the beautiful. And it is this grandeur of the human spirit which alone can explain man's present life, with its misery and its anguish, its exaltation and its tireless striving.

What indeed is the chief characteristic of our present life? Is it not made up of a striking paradox? There is nothing to which men cling with greater zest than life; and yet is there anything that men bewail more than the pettiness and misery of this present life? When men have reached their highest and best in all human pursuits, what has been their final verdict? A sense of dissatisfaction with the vanity of human life, a dissatisfaction which not infrequently grows to the dimensions of pessimism and melancholy. The greatest literatures throb with it: it is in the sayings of Solomon, in the works of Homer and Sophocles, in the greatest Christian and non-Christian poets. The sweetest music, the deepest poetry, the most ambitious art, all have one great motif which is the disparity between the magnitude of human aspiration and the pettiness of human achievement. The scientist after a life of research feels somewhat like a little child who plays on the shores of an ocean of mystery, the philosopher lays down his pen, the saint grows silent out of the poverty of his powers to express. In the very heart of human life is an undying tension between the infinitude of man's desires and the limitations of his meagre human satisfactions or achievements.

It is this discrepancy which is the secret source of the human threnodies that reëcho from man's deepest thoughts. The pessimist convinced, who seeks his own way out of life, is only a more striking affirmation of the fundamental human fact. For the pessimist is one who has forgotten the deeper aspect of man's life, its irresistible craving for completion and fulness. In his preoccupation with the pettiness of the present life he overlooks life's magnitude. And yet it is his desire for fulness of life which alone explains the pessimism of the pessimist For pessimism is despair, and despair is hope frustrated. At the heart of human life then there is hope, there is man's striving for a happiness which can be conferred on him by God alone. The possession of God is the goal of life.

IV

Thus far we have employed only the light of pure reason. The Christian Faith has nothing to say in the rational arguments which Aquinas employed to show that God is the goal of life for man. It is from the idea of possession that he is able to make transition to the typically Christian ideal of life. For there are two kinds of possession of God; one that is mediate and indirect, the other which is immediate and face to face. The difference may be illustrated. It is one thing, for instance, to see the sun directly and another to behold its reflexions in the clouds at evening. Now, as far as the natural mind of man, or any other finite being goes, the only possession of which they would be capable in regard to God would be an indirect one, seeing God as it were reflected in the clouds. There could be no question of a face-to-face vision. That issue for human life was made known by Jesus Christ, and Christianity may be said to offer man the vision of God as the end of life and to call men to its pursuit. But before that vision is possible, a new life, a supernatural life, must be given to man to strengthen his native incapacity and put him in the way of coming to God directly. That new life is the life merited for mankind by Christ in the Redemption: it is called grace, or the supernatural life of the soul: the Church on earth is the custodian of that life, and her whole sacramental and dogmatic systems have to do with it.

But this teaching on the ultimate issue of human life throws a new light on the present life of man. The fact that God chose to become man, to take unto Himself human nature in the ineffable unity of one Person, is already suggestive: the fact that all men have been called to espousals with divinity in eternity is also suggestive. But if I were to sum up in a single phrase the contribution of Jesus Christ to the problem of life, I should say that Christ was the first to reveal to man his own self in its full magnificence. He brought to the world a revelation of the value of every single person: He revolutionized mankind by emphasizing the transcendent value of human personality.

The German philosopher, Hegel, went so far as to say that with Christianity man first discovered himself as a personality. "Entire quarters of the world, Africa and the East, have never had," he says, " and have not yet, this idea. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics had it not. It came into the world with Christianity, in which the individual, as such, had an infinite worth, as being the aim and object of divine charity." This, perhaps, is an exaggerated statement, though in the recognition of woman's personality Christianity does mark a definite progress. But what is entirely certain is that Christianity initiates a new era in the real significance of human personality. "Christian philosophy," writes M. J. Maritain, "tells us than the person is a complete individual substance, intellectual in nature and master of its actions, *sui juris,* autonomous, in the authentic sense of the word. And so the word person is reserved for substances which possess that divine thing, the spirit, and are in consequence, each by itself, a world above the whole bodily order, a spiritual and moral world which, strictly speaking, is a part of this universe and whose secret is hidden even from the natural perception of the angels. The word person is reserved for substances which, choosing their end, are capable of themselves deciding on the means, and of introducing series of new events into the universe by liberty; for substances which can say after their kind, *fiat,* and it is so. And what makes their dignity, who makes their personality, is just exactly the subsistence of the spiritual and immortal soul and its supreme independence in regard to all the fleeting imagery and all the machinery of sensible phenomena. Hence St. Thomas teaches that the word person signifies the noblest and highest thing in all nature.'

In a word, the one system of philosophy at the present day which is really standing for the ultimate good of men is the system which emphasizes the value of human personality. Christianity stands or falls with this appreciation of the worth of the human person. Liberalism, which was the doctrine of the last century, regarded men as mere economic factors, and left the weak to the mercy of the strong: its whole attitude missed the significance of the value of the human person, no matter what his station in life may have been. As a reaction against such a system, which excluded human considerations, from public life, regarded religion as a purely private affair with no message for the community at large, Bolshevism appeared. But Bolshevism does not improve matters when it reduces man to the level of matter and denies all horizons for the human spirit. There is only one philosophy broad enough for man, only one philosophy which harmonizes his personal and his social life, the philosophy which recognizes that as a person his ultimate end is not the State and yet that as an individual he must find his natural happiness in community with his fellows. And even then, if all the relationships of justice were fulfilled, there would still be room for the aroma and the perfume of Christian charity amongst men, whose highest boast should be that they are sons of God, with an ultimate goal of happiness which will come from communion of life in Him in whom we live and move and have our being—God.

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THE MORALIST AND PROFITS IN BUSINESS.

DESPITE the fact that for the last eight years, innumerable persons in the civilized world have bent their efforts to an analysis and solution of our economic difficulties, we are still almost as far removed from the answer as we were in 1930. Indeed, in some respects we are worse off than before. The financial condition of the government, to mention only one phase, has added its bit to the problem. Nevertheless the depression period has not been without its achievements.

It cannot be denied, for instance, that individuals have made progress in the science of economics. People who before gave little attention to such things, now understand something of the meaning of such words as production, stocks, bonds, profits and consumption. This is decidedly to the advantage of society, as the ignorance and guillibility of the people have heretofore been assets for those to whom justice and charity mean nothing.

The march of progress has extended to Government officials who now realize the necessity of paying some attention to the social aspects of wealth and exchange. Government has ceased to be merely a tool in the hands of the privileged. Even the very rich have made progress in that, with some startling exceptions, they have theoretically at least discarded the antiquated theories of liberalism and *laissez faire* philosophies. Most of them now understand that selfishness and greed cannot but have their repercussions on the social and political order. There has been a noticeable revival of good will and the spirit of coöperation.

The surprising thing is that, in spite of these advances and in spite of the efforts of economic experts and laymen alike, the answer to the problem is still something belonging to the future. These pressing puzzles are still unsolved. Unemployment is still with us. There is still an overwhelming concentration of wealth. Legislation, while it has gone far beyond the wishes of some, has touched only the fringe of the problem. In reality it has not met the issue squarely, and in numerous instances it has contradicted itself.

Demagogues have shouted and have been shouted down. Panaceas have been offered and rejected simply because they are panaceas. Suggestions for the revision of our monetary system have been advanced and have been disregarded for apparently no reason at all. Communists have given us their solution and have met with opposition from both the capitalistic and the Christian viewpoint. The Church has proposed its solution and has met with vocal opposition from the Communists, and with what for all practical purposes is equivalent to opposition from the capitalists. The capitalists have advanced no solution at all, unless the suggestion that the depression can be cured by the same causes that brought it on, can be looked upon as a solution. There is no doubt that, if Catholic principles were put into practice by everyone, the depression or recession would soon be a thing of the past. There have been and still are too many who refuse to conform to these principles and the standards of the most selfish, owing to competition, become the ethical standards of the group.

The only alternative is that the solution must be brought about by the state. Government must determine by legislation what is to be done, and must enforce its decrees upon the unwilling. No cure can be efficacious until a careful analysis has revealed exactly what is wrong. The ills that afflict society are to be found in two aspects of the question: the economic and the moral. There are deliberate injustices committed. One sees greed and lack of regard for the rights of others. Such things have aggravated the evils that afflict society and they must be overcome. But the principal solution is to be found not so much in what is commonly looked upon as the ethical and moral aspects of the question, as in what is generally considered its mathematics and mechanics. People for the most part want to do what is right, and those who do not can be forced into line. It may be said, however, that we are generally prone to take too narrow a view of what belongs in the moral and ethical sphere. We have come to consider economic laws as immutable and as much beyond the control of man as are the physical laws of nature. The law of supply and demand, the laws governing production and consumption are considered to be as fixed and independent of man's will as the law of gravity or those governing the movements of the planets.

The laws of economics, however, are not merely mechanical. They are the laws of human nature. In sciences such as psychology or sociology the element of free will enters and hence, unlike biology or physics, these sciences are not so amenable to mechanical formulas. True, the laws laid down are based upon experience and history and they work out most of the time. But because of the element of free will there are exceptions. Economic activity is also to some extent dependent on man. In so far as it is so dependent it can be governed by law. It is not merely mathematical, it is also moral.

Among the elements of economic activity which are subject to the control of man, and which therefore have a moral as well as an economic aspect, is the element of profits which is recognized as an essential one in our prevailing economic structure.

It has always been conceded that the moralist has something to say about excessive profits. Profits that are out of proportion have always been regarded as wrong. There is however no general agreement as to what constitutes excessive profits, and the mere concept of profit as such has been considered so much a part of the mechanical side of modern economics as to receive little attention from the moralist. Little effort has been made to justify it. It has been conceived as so essentially pertaining to the system that nothing can be done about it.

The early and medieval theologians however gave the matter a great deal of attention. Changing economic conditions have brought about a general change in attitude regarding the morality of profits. The change has carried the Catholic theologian in its path until now he is inclined to assume a more liberal attitude, and to regard the views of earlier theologians as entirely too strict and out of line with the progress that has been made in recent years. The experience of the past few years seems to indicate that this change is hardly justified and that it might be well to reëxamine the matter in the light of the principles laid down by the Holy See.

About what has heretofore been considered the moral aspect of material welfare there is little to be said. The Encyclicals have treated that field exhaustively. Volumes have also been written on the economic phase until now the literature is so vast that no one can hope to digest it all. But whereas the Encyclicals clarify, the works on the purely economic side serve only to obscure the question. The Encyclicals have laid down definite principles in the light of which the ethical problems can be solved. On the other hand, few definite principles of any permanent value have been advanced by the economists. It is hard to distinguish between what are established principles and what are mere theories and still worse between theories and false assumptions.

Some of these assumptions are deliberately calculated to deceive the ordinary person. Some have been uttered so often that the economists themselves have been deceived by them. A glaring example of the former is the assertion that developments resulting from our economic difficulties have reached a point where there is a conflict between Government and the liberty that has been traditional in this country. In a sense this is true. Law is always opposed to liberty. But the proponents of this assertion present it as though it were something new. They skip blithely over the fact that until Government assumed a principal rôle there had been conflict between liberty and industrial slavery, a conflict that does not fit into the Christian scheme of things. A logical process leads from this assertion to the conclusion that the State should keep its hands off and allow the industrial monarchs to continue to multiply profits untrammelled. We are asked: Do we want to gain economic security at the price of giving up our freedom? The real question is not whether we prefer security to freedom, but whether we prefer security with restricted liberty to little liberty any way and no security at all. The conflict is not so much between liberty and Government but between Government and big business. Deliberate confusion of the issues, whilst it usually is to the selfish advantage of the individual, is not helpful to society in the time of crisis.

An example of the assumptions that deceive economists and to some extent modern moralists too, is the notion that money is essentially productive; that it gains interest of itself. Attempts are made to justify the lending of money at interest simply on the plea that, if it were not loaned, it could be invested at a profit. The question whether or not the alternative investment is conformable to the laws of justice is passed over. Yet the latter issue is precisely the one involved. In the first place, it is not true to suppose that all money could be invested in partnership enterprises. Some of it simply has to be loaned. In the second place, profits as such do not become licit simply on the score that they are assumed to be just, nor yet on the grounds that they are part of the system. Nor can particular applications of a principle, the money-lending phase for instance, be justified on any general theory unless the theory is proved in its whole extension. If the arguments adduced can demonstrate the principle only in part, only that part can righly be said to have economic and ethical being. The rest is a myth and at least a material fraud.

The acceptance of the principle of Government intervention does not mean that we must therefore admit the wisdom of all the legislation enacted up to this time. There is room for opinion and discussion not only about matters that are likely to be considered in the future but even about the laws that are already in force. A principle that is not open to debate must be a very fundamental and obvious one. A discussion of principle of such a fundamental and obvious nature is likely to be regarded as useless, since it may be readily assumed that everybody knows about it already. An excuse for such a discussion can sometimes be found, however, in the fact that even primary and essential considerations are sometimes disregarded in practice. That is what prompts this article.

It will not propose any new economic theories, for the writer is not an economist. It will not advance detailed suggestions, since the writer is not sufficiently familiar with the vast amount of statistical information available and necessary for such detailed correctives. At the risk of appearing commonplace, it is proposed to restate a very old and very evident principle in the light of which all detailed legislation must be examined if it is to work. It is a principle that is certain, and, if it is applied, the system of capitalism will work; if it is neglected, the system must of necessity break down. From this principle a very reasonable conclusion regarding profits can be drawn.

The proper remedy can be applied only when the causes of the evils that afflict us are known. The first mistake in attempting to analyze these causes is to choose the wrong method. An examination of the story of the depression reveals that there are two methods in general use by those who are qualified to speak on economic matters. There is the *a posteriori* viewpoint of the statisticians and historians. This is perhaps the most common, and while the very serious scholarship put into this research must be admired and while it is necessary in working out the details of legislation, it must be admitted that it has not achieved great success in its purpose of solving our difficulties, because it does not lead with certitude to the principle the disregard of which has destroyed the balance in our capitalistic system.

The other viewpoint is the *a priori* one of the mathematician and philosopher. Of course this is a medieval method; but it is the one Saint Thomas would use to-day if he were here to turn his mind to the problem. It is the method of many of the so-called " brain-trusters." It meets with the objection of many, notably the industrialists who, while they reject it as a basis of demonstration, have no hesitancy in using it as a ground for objection and rebuttal.

This *a priori* answer is derided because it is too simple, whereas the problem is complex. Simplicity is in their eyes the guarantee of falseness. That in itself is an *a priori* assumption. They tell us that we must go to history and experience for light and guidance. If history and experience had presented a definite solution, no objection could be made to such advice. If history had the answer, there would be no problem. History shows that the problem has never really been solved, but has been allowed to grow. It shows that men have been satisfied with an inadequate and temporary solution and have left the main issue for the future. Even if this were not so, the extraordinary severity of the present depression should make us realize that we cannot safely assume complacently that recovery will take the same course as it has followed in the past.

The *a posteriori* point of view is deficient in that it is difficult to determine whether or not all the elements that have an influence upon an economic effect have been examined. Frequently the same effect is attributed to contrary causes. Sometimes the statistical method leads to conclusions that are obviously incorrect and sometimes even impossible. Because of the fact, for instance, that over a brief period when both wages and profits were high, the standard of living of the American workingman attained its greatest heights, it is concluded that the goal to be achieved now is to raise both profits and wages.

Obviously, unless technological improvement decreases the number of those employed, this is impossible without at the same time raising prices, and while high wages, high profits and high prices may for the moment work to the advantage of the workingman, owing to the availability of foreign markets or to such practices as unlimited installment buying and easy credit (which lay their toll against the future), it must of necessity work to his disadvantage in the long run when the time comes to render an account. Such processes are just as inflationary as printing-press money and more insidious because their dangers are disguised. We are not looking for an economic system that works part of the time, but for one that maintains a continued equilibrium over the years.

The advocates of the historical method want to take us back as far as ancient Greece to examine the economic system then obtaining. We are told that when such and such conditions were verified, such and such effects took place. Hence it is to our advantage or disadvantage, as the case may be, to reproduce such and such conditions. It is the old fallacy, *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. There are so many elements that it is difficult to determine which conditions were actually responsible for these effects. Especially is this true when, as in this matter, the experiment cannot be repeated very often.

We do not need history to know that two and two is four or that the square of the hypotenuse of a triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. Mathematics is independent of history; and if we discount the moral and ethical aspect, mathematics is all that is left of the science of economics. What is purely mathematical is determined. The rest somehow involves free will, can be governed by law, and is the proper object of moral science.

Our highly industrialized, capitalistic system has brought into being a vast number of terms, concepts and even professions unheard of in the simplified economic system of bygone days. These innovations, while they may facilitate the exchange of goods, certainly facilitate the concentration of wealth. Some of these new ideas have worked to the advantage of society; some have not. They have all tended to an increase of profits, to a building up and perpetuation of an artificial system which is difficult for the layman to understand and to which, so long as the arrangement worked, the average man gave little attention. It became necessary to analyze the system, to unravel its intricate skeins, only when it broke down.

That analysis reveals that the same elements that existed before the industrial revolution are the essential elements of the order that obtain to-day. The most intricate machine of this era, for instance, is no less instrumental in its causality than the bow and arrow of the savage. Electric current does not differ essentially in its economic aspects from the air currents that have been driving windmills for centuries. Both are forces of nature that have been turned to advantage by the intelligence and labor of man. To-day as in the past the principal cause of usable goods is human labor which produces them for the use of man. It is unlikely for this reason that the ergosophy theory of value has added anything to the older Marxian theory. Indeed it has detracted from it. Whatever may be said regarding his other views, at least Karl Marx was almost right when he proposed his theory of value. Human labor, if not, as must be admitted, the only constituent of value, is certainly by far the most important element.

Two things are essential to man's life on earth and material comfort: the use of the goods of this world which is called consumption, and the labor which after the fall of man is necessary to bring those goods into being, or production. Production and consumption are and always have been the chief elements of economic life. They are not essential merely to commerce or the exchange of goods but are independent of it. They would exist, in other words, even if there were no commerce or exchange. They exist whether or not there are banks, stock markets or chambers of commerce. " In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return."[1] Thus Sacred Scripture defines the relation between production and consumption. They are the absolute values in so far as material things can be called absolute. They have objective, ontological being. Without them material life is impossible. No artificial system of commerce and exchange can do away with them. Of these, production is directed to consumption as to its end. The sweat of man's brow is the means by which he earns his bread. In the objective scheme of things as Almighty God established it, independent of man's intellect, independent of psychology, production is for consumption. They are correlative terms. Without production there is no consumption, and without consumption, production is to no purpose.

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[1] Gen. 3:19.

It is idle therefore to seek the solution of our difficulties merely in the element of production. It is a fallacy to suppose that goods can continuously be produced for greater profits, without giving due attention to distribution and consumption. The assumption that if goods are produced they will somehow be sold, is, upon *a priori* grounds amply confirmed by experience, unwarranted.

Yet, while consumption is objectively the purpose of production, psychologically it is not. All we hear about is production for profit. As a motive for production, profit has a very definite place. So long as the profit motive is subordinate to the real reason for production, namely use, little harm is done to the economic system. Indeed the system benefits. When however it becomes the only motive, when the demands of consumption are entirely disregarded, the system breaks down. Reality is sacrificed to preserve a figment of the mind. Selfish interests are emphasized to the detriment of the social welfare.

Let us first consider the element of profit in relation to the objective scheme of things. The chapter in the book of Genesis just quoted does not say anything about profit. It is not absolutely necessary. Life can go without it. Unlike production and consumption it is not independent of exchange but necessarily presupposes it. If there were no exchange, if man produced only for his own needs, there would be no possibility of profit. The need for profit presupposes the need for exchange. Since man cannot himself produce all that he needs, exchange of goods and services is necessary, and the door to profit is opened.

Nor is profit absolutely necessary to the exchange of goods. Commerce could be carried on without profit to either party unless the word profit is used to signify greater utility in the goods obtained, in which case both parties to the contract would gain profit. The term however is not used generally in this sense. Nor is it used to mean the reward that accrues for services, when those services actually add to the value of goods. It means ordinarily the difference in the value of exchanged commodities or services. Barter therefore while independent of money was not always profitless. The horse trader of recent memory furnishes an example. Greater utility is always the legitimate motive for exchange, just as it is the motive for production. Greater utility is however in the present system not always consumption but sometimes profit, which if turned for the most part to consumptive uses preserves the necessary balance between production and consumption; when not turned to such uses, the balance is destroyed. The more readily goods can be exchanged the more they are desired. Nothing can be exchanged so easily as money, which therefore is the commodity most desired. Because of money, in its various forms, profit can be stored up or used to multiply itself to the further disruption of the economic system.

When the wages of the workingman and the income from capital investment used for consumption purposes are unable to absorb the output of industry, over-production or under-consumption occurs. There is a falling off in demand, a lowering of prices, decrease in employment and wages and only then a decrease in profits in the strict sense of the word.

It is well to repeat here that some profits are used for purposes of consumption. There can be no serious objection to that, so long as the right of the workingman is paramount. "The husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits."[2] So long as consumption is not disregarded it makes no difference, so far as society is concerned, whether the means are derived from profits or wages. In other words, production for profit for consumption is in the long run equivalent to production for consumption.

After wages, this sort of profit is the first to suffer. Long before the salaries of the management are decreased or bonuses forgone, dividend after dividend is passed up to the disadvantage of the small stockholder, who like the workingman has been using most of his income to absorb the output of industry.

While production for profit for consumption is for all practical purposes equivalent to production for consumption, so far as the equilibrium of the system is concerned, production for profit for more profit is not. It is precisely this profit, namely profit put back into production to make more profit, that causes all the difficulty, and whereas it should be the first to feel the collapse of the economic structure, it is in reality the last. This point is made of course with regard to the totality of profits in relation to the total production and total consumption in a given economic unit. That unit, owing to the absence of tariff barriers between states and their presence between ourselves and foreign nations, may for all practical purposes be said to be coextensive with the national boundaries of the United States. Now if profiteering is limited to one or the other individual or if foreign nations do the consuming for us, the arrangement is not greatly harmed. Such conditions cannot exist for a long time. The first will disappear because of bad example and the second for the reason that, just as there must be a balance between individuals, there must also be a balance between nations.

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[2] II Tim. 2:6.

If production is ordered to consumption as a means to an end, what leaves the field of production must go into consumption. If income never leaves the field of production at all, the equation between production and consumption, the only solid foundation on which our economic order rests, is destroyed, and in its place is built up an artificial system for the preservation of which, in modern economic theory, real values including the lives and health of future generations must be sacrificed. The production-consumption basis is the solid foundation upon which the not so solid superstructure of profit rests. Conditions cannot but become worse if we attempt to repair the superstructure with stones taken from the foundation.

To save the edifice, production must not be regarded independently of consumption. Perhaps it is asking to much to expect the industrialists to take the element of distribution into consideration, when they make suggestions for the improvement of business. If they were men of vision, who could see beyond the immediate future and realize that what is harmful to the general welfare must of necessity be detrimental to themselves as individuals, they would do so. Even if individuals fail in this, surely it is not asking too much of Government, whose duty it is to protect the common good, to take both sides of the question into consideration when it draws up legislation.

No legislation toward increased production should be admitted unless it first be understood what effect it will have upon the distribution of goods. Pass a wages and hours bill and allow prices to get out of hand and you have accomplished exactly nothing.

The general attitude of the industrialist is exemplified in his point of view regarding the undistributed profits tax. This example is mentioned not with the purpose of defending the tax, but merely to illustrate the attitude of the industrialist and to examine the grounds upon which opposition to this tax is based. The tax may or may not be a good thing, but certainly complaints against it are not justified on the arguments proposed. They tell us that profits are needed to expand production if more capital is not forthcoming. It is assumed that production must be increased. To increase production by putting profits back into it is all right when there is enough consumer demand to use up the fruits of expanded industry. To put profits to such uses merely to avoid paying dividends or taxes cannot be justified on any social grounds. It is true that there is need for increased production, but before this can be brought about there is need for turning more of the profits of present production into channels of consumption. As demand increases, so also will production and profits. They cannot expand independently of that demand. When consumer needs require it, expanding production and higher profits are placed upon a solid basis. Otherwise they are a figment of the imagination. Before repealing this tax, our legislators should take both points of view into consideration. If they are guided only by the advice of industrialists, legislation that is distorted from the social standpoint is likely to result.

While profits for the most part are for the good of the individual, they have nevertheless, even from social considerations, a very definite place in the capitalistic economic order. Without them the machine will not go. They supply the motive that sets the wheels of industry in action. The industrialists as a class will not operate without the hope of profit. Industry differs from the other walks of life. It may be a sad commentary upon the altruism of the industrial man, but it is a fact. The doctor, the policeman, the fireman, the nurse and the teacher are frequently called upon to exercise their particular functions without the hope of profit. They are moved by social considerations, as is evident from the fact that no profit whatever could compensate them for the sacrifices they are at times compelled to make. They frequently give practical evidence that they understand the obligations they owe to their fellow man. That evidence is sadly lacking when we consider the capitalist as a class. It would be unfair of course to apply this condemnation universally. Some industrialists have risen above their station in life to pay some attention to the social aspects of wealth, just as some professional men have fallen below theirs to misuse their calling for their own selfish advantage.

If the purpose of profit socially is to keep the wheels of production moving, profits are justified only in so far as they accomplish that purpose. It follows that they can never become so small that production will be insufficient to meet consumer demand nor so large that consumers will be unable to absorb the supply of production.

In all the history of the capitalistic system, profits have never in the aggregate been too small. The failure of supply on occasion to meet the demand has been due to other causes, such as drought and floods. On the other hand, liberalism has made it possible for profits to accumulate to the extent that owners have at times been hard pressed to figure out what to do with them. The flood of worthless foreign bonds which added to the hardships of the depression had their origin in these excessive profits. When they are too high, they are an incentive to overcapitalization, to watered stock, to credit inflation and in general to the artificial increase in values, which like a toy ballon inflated too much eventually explodes.

This article has paid no attention to particular injustices such as result from the improper division of income between profit and wages. Such injustices should of course be corrected. Neither is it concerned with dividends or interest paid out to ordinary holders of stock and bonds. These returns usually find their way into consumption. As a matter of fact there would be no need to worry greatly even about excessive profits if they too were turned to consumption purposes. But excessive profits cannot be so directed. There is a limit even to what the very rich can make use of. Excessive profits mean of necessity the breakdown of the system. On the other hand, if the production-consumption principle is applied, the system will work despite individual injustices, just as banking goes on regardless of bank robberies, and traffic regardless of the number killed or maimed. This does not mean of course that we should approve of these abuses. The sooner they are corrected the better off we shall be.

It may be objected that capital is entitled to high profits because it assumes the risk of loss. If the premise were correct in its whole extension and the losses were actually in proportion to the profits, the conclusion would undoubtedly be correct. Capital investment would be a game of chance which, whilst it might bring about the ruin of individuals, would not, if confined to this or that investor, affect the social order to any great extent. It is not correct if we take all the investors in the aggregate. The danger of loss to the whole group is founded for the most part precisely upon high profits. The group loses when the system loses.

The fact, however, is that capital in general assumes no risk. When things look darkest they run to the Government for aid and, having obtained it, they resent the fact that the same helping hand is extended to their less fortunate brethren. The aid that has been extended to capital has done more to retard recovery, than the unbalancing of the budget brought about primarily by the help given the unemployed. It does not do any good when a balloon is approaching the bursting point, to try to patch up the minute holes through which gas is escaping. Such a procedure indicates more concern for saving the gas than for saving the balloon.

To keep profits within bounds two things are primarily necessary: a revision upward of the income tax and a revision downward of the rate of interest. The first should be directed preferably against the ultimate recipient of profits rather than against the corporation as such, and if necessary should be increased to the point of diminishing returns. That point can be pushed still further back by stepping up the rate sooner. The justice of such a tax is apparent, since profits are at best founded upon a very unstable premise and since it is based upon a fundamental principle of distributive justice, ability to pay. The purpose of the second is to bring the profits accruing from bonded indebtedness more into line with that arising from ownership investment and thus making them more dependent upon actual increase in value. If Government bonds were thus reduced, a step in the direction of the accomplishment of this purpose would be made which would have the further good effect of saving the people money and likely would free some of the idle capital of the country. The budget could thus be brought into balance with receipts and expenditures at a very high figure. Another method would be to increase wages while maintaining prices at the present level. Again, a balanced budget could result with much smaller numbers on both sides of the ledger.

A balanced budget is the effect of a balanced economic system. It is not a means to this end. Balancing the budget is not the first step on the way out of the depression, as is quite evident from the fact that the budget was not in such a bad condition when the depression started. It is not likely to cure what it could not prevent.

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THE MASS AS SUBJECT OF THE RETREAT.

AMONG the customary exercises of the spiritual life at least for priests and religious, is the annual retreat. We are familiar with the purpose and the methods of conducting these retreats. A thorough and solid renewal of the spiritual life must, of course, always be based on the same fundamental truths of our holy faith. Yet these truths may be considered under many different aspects. A great deal of variety is *ipso facto* given by the change of the retreat master. The same retreat master will, as a rule, give a retreat to the same audience only rarely, and if so, only after a number of years. Another cause of variety lies in this that various religious organizations have developed their own system of giving retreats, which they seek to perfect and to conform to existing needs. But there is still room for greater variety especially in the choice of subject; by this I mean a religious truth or fact which forms the central idea of the whole retreat, the viewpoint from which all other truths are considered.

The present paper has for its purpose to suggest for a retreat subject the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. It attempts to show that the Mass offers all the elements necessary for a thorough renewal of the spiritual life and has the additional advantage, possibly more than any other subject, of bringing our whole spiritual life into intimate contact with the source of all grace, the sacrifice of our Saviour, reënacted in an unbloody manner upon the altar. After such a retreat every Mass would also bring back to our minds the thoughts and sentiments that animated us during the retreat and keep alive the retreat spirit which, as we well know, is so easily and quickly lost after the retreat.

Spiritual writers characterize the approach of the soul to God as the *via purgativa*, *illuminativa* and *unitiva*. The last is the goal, the first two the preparation. Practically the same progress is followed in every retreat, though the same terms may not be used. It is a logical, systematic method of procedure. The same approach to God is found clearly illustrated in the structure of the Mass. There we have the *via purgativa*, the cleansing of the soul, in the Confiteor and the following prayers to the Kyrie eleison. The *via illuminativa*, the enlightening of the soul, is contained in the Gloria, the Epistle and the Gospel; all of these we accept as our norm of life in the Credo. There follows the *via unitiva,* the life of union with Jesus the divine high priest and victim in the Offertory to the Communion. A fitting introduction and closing is provided in the psalm Judica and the closing parts of the Mass.

INTRODUCTION.

The psalm Judica strikes the keynote of the retreat: I shall go in to the altar of God, to God who giveth joy to my youth.

The historical background of the psalm is well known. David on his flight before Absalom pours out the sorrow of his soul. Keeping this historical background in mind, the application of the psalm at the beginning of a retreat offers no difficulty. Enemies have risen against our soul: " satan and the evil spirit, who roam through the world, seeking the destruction of souls," employing the services of a wicked and unholy world. Right with us is the unjust and treacherous man, our own nature, inclined to evil from its youth, " the old man ", as St. Paul is wont to call it. These enemies have caused us much trouble and grief in the past. Every sin meant a victory for these enemies and a defeat for us. In moments of quiet reflexion we come to a fuller realization of our dangerous condition. There is no hope for us except in God; to Him we flee. We take our cause before Him; His rights have been violated in us and by us. We want to have nothing to do with this injustice any more; we want to break with our sinful past and follow the ways of justice. God's light and truth guide us to His holy mountain, Calvary; we find it transplanted upon our altars. The sacred mysteries enacted upon them are the incontestable proof that God loves us in spite of our sins and wants to save us. There we shall again find mercy, peace and joy. Thus I will go in to the altar of God, to God, who giveth joy to my youth. Why art thou sad, O my soul, and why dost thou disquiet me? Hope in God, for I will still give praise to Him, my Saviour and my God.

THE CLEANSING OF THE SOUL.

Confiteor.

" If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity ".[1] The humble, sorrowful admission of our guilt is the first step in our approach to God. So I confess, I do not deny, I do not excuse, but sincerely and humbly confess that I have sinned. I make this confession before God, who alone can raise me to a new life of greater fervor and love; before all the saints of the heavenly court, that they may intercede for me. Finally, I confess: to you brethren: have we not often been a cause of disedification, of scandal to others, to those even, whom we were to guide on the road of perfection? Do we not owe them some reparation? Let it be at least this humble confession at the foot of the altar. Even ordinary people will understand that priests are human, they will forgive and be edified, if they know this our humble confession.

I confess that I have sinned exceedingly, exceeding all thought and all imagination, all measure of the allowable or excusable. I have thus sinned in thought and word and deed, through my fault, through my most grievous fault. What a practical examination of conscience! But let us put the blame where it belongs: sin is sin only in so far as we are responsible for it by advertence and consent: through my fault.

Prayers after the Confiteor.

The realization of our condition leads to prayer. Reflecting upon the prayers which follow the Confiteor we find new aspects of the malice of sin, of its fearful effects upon the soul.

" Turn to us, O God, and give us life, and thy people shall rejoice in thee." It is human language, yet how well it pictures to us the effects of sin. We have turned away from Him, so He has turned away from us. He could not bear the sight of sin, the abuse of His gifts, the trampling under foot of the blood of Jesus, the desecration of the temple of the Holy Spirit. Yet, He is our light and our life, much more than the sun is the source of light and life in the material world; where He has turned away, there is darkness and the corruption of death. Yet, we were made for happiness; we can find it only in God.

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[1] John 1:9.

"Show us, O Lord, thy mercy and grant us thy salvation."

His mercy is our only hope; we have no other claim upon Him. Sin has made us beggars with nothing to live on unless supplied by charity; it has put us in debt, which we shall never be able to pay; it has made us slaves without power to break asunder the chains of slavery. We appear before Him like subdued rebels brought before their conqueror. Yet, above all the works of God is His mercy: "If the wicked do penance for all his sins . . . and do judgment and justice, living he shall live and shall not die".[2]

"O Lord, hear my prayer, and let my cry come unto thee."

A man lost in a dense forest will shout to make himself heard in order to secure help; a man attacked by robbers, or caught in a burning house, will call for help; a man in pain and agony will moan aloud, if only to give expression to his sufferings, which he can hardly bear alone. The distance of the sinner from God cannot be measured by space, the danger to his salvation is appalling; his pain and suffering at the realization of his condition unbearable. Is it any wonder that he cries out to God from the bottom of a crushed and humbled heart?

"Take away, we beseech thee, O Lord, from us our iniquities, so that with pure minds we may enter into the holy of holies."

With God there is hope and salvation, and the pledge of His saving will we behold before us upon the altar, the holy of holies. We want to be there, near the merciful God. How the high priest and the people of old had to sanctify themselves on the day of atonement, when the high priest alone was allowed to enter the holy of holies. Let those external purifications be replaced by the intensity of our sorrow and the desire for forgiveness.

"We beseech thee, O Lord, through the merits of thy saints, whose relics are here and all the saints, that thou mayest vouchsafe to forgive all my sins."

The saints, whose relics are in the altar, were once members of the Church militant; they are closely related to their brethren on earth. Loving Christ, they love the souls for whom Christ died, and the loyalty which they have shown to their Master makes them eminently fitted to intercede for sinners.

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[2] Ezech. 18:21.

The Introit.

The Introit will easily lend itself to continue the ideas expressed so far, by rousing greater sorrow or hope or the desire for a better life and thus, with even greater humility, sorrow, love and confidence, we turn again to God with a last passionate cry for mercy.

Kyrie eleison.

There follows the petition for mercy, addressed three times to each Divine Person. In these repetitions we can see the three fundamental relations, in which each Divine Person stands to us. The works of love and mercy, which we ascribe to these Divine persons are as many grounds for our hope. Saving our souls, we save the work of God, and our salvation is His greatest honor.

Lord, have mercy.

To the Father we look up as to our creator; we are the masterpiece of His creative hand. What a pity if we should not do the work and reach the end for which He has created us. He is our Father, because He has made us after His image and likeness; what a grief it would be to see His likeness marred and his children eternally separated from Him. He is our last end, because whatever He does He can do only for His own glory, and only in giving Him this glory can we attain to happiness. Thou hast made us for Thee, O God, and restless is our heart until it finds its rest in Thee.

Christ, have mercy.

Christ is our Redeemer, since our souls are bought with His Precious Blood. What a loss, if this Blood should have been shed in vain. Christ is our brother, since He has merited for us the adoption of sons. What a grief for Jesus to see His Father's sorrow over the loss of a child. He is our judge and must pronounce sentence according to strict justice. What a grief for Him to condemn to everlasting punishment a soul, for whom He shed His Blood.

Lord, have mercy.

The Holy Ghost is our sanctifier; applying to us the merits of Christ, He makes our souls the temples of the triune God. What an affront to Him to see His temple desecrated and Himself driven out by sin. He is our Paraclete; He has accepted our cause and He is not willing to lose it. He is our consummator, who wants to perfect in the life to come the work which He has begun here on earth. He does not want to be deprived of the glory of beholding forever the objects of the love and tender care of the almighty and merciful God.

Indeed, the Kyrie eleison is the outcry of intensest pain and sorrow of a soul that has come to the realization of the incomprehensible folly and malice of sin. From the depth of the misery and humiliation of sin we pray to our Helper in need: Lord, have mercy, Christ, have mercy; Lord, have mercy.

I. The Enlightning of the Soul.

God will not reject a humble and contrite heart, and the prayer of the humble pierceth the clouds. Such a passionate appeal to His mercy the merciful God cannot resist. He answers our prayer by the enlightening of the soul. He shows us anew the purpose of our lives, and gives us a norm to guide us in our work and to avoid the mistakes of the past.

The Gloria.

It states the program of our Redeemer's life as it was announced by the angels in that silent holy night of the Nativity. Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will. As it was the Saviour's program, so it must be the program of all who wish to be saved. Not following it in the past, we have made ourselves miserable; by following it in the future we shall have peace in this life and be eternally happy in the life to come. According to the words of the Gloria we are to praise and bless, to adore and glorify and to give thanks.—In connexion with these duties the recitation of the divine office, good intentions and good example deserve special attention.

Oremus.

That we may be able to carry out the program of the Gloria, we need the assistance of grace, and it must be implored by humble prayer. The prayer of petition occurs extensively during the course of the Mass. Community prayer is more efficacious than private prayer, especially if it be the liturgical prayer of the Church.—A consideration of prayer in general, of liturgical prayer in particular, as well as active participation in the holy sacrifice of the Mass might profitably be added here.

The Epistle.

It is the plan of God to lead men through men. For this purpose he has founded the Church and appointed her to be the teacher and guide of men. There is no coming to God unless it be through the Church. St. Gregory says: "First comes the preaching of the word of God, and then the Lord himself holds entrance into the house of the soul. The words of exhortation come first and by them truth enters our minds." If sufficient time is at our disposal an explanation of the one or other epistle of the retreat days might be given here. For further practical application might be taken spiritual reading, the Christian's attitude toward the Church—*sentire cum ecclesia.*

The Gospel.

Glad tidings is the meaning of the term and rightly so, for the gospel brings the most joyful message the world has ever heard. "God who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days hath spoken to us by his Son."[3] But He did not only teach. He began to do and to teach, as St. Luke puts it. He gave the example that we might see and do in like manner: "I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also."[4]

It would be appropriate to discuss in this place one or other gospel text, or some event from the life of our Lord, especially His Passion. Preaching and the imitation of Christ in the Christian's life might be given practical attention.

With the gospel the enlightening of the soul is completed. We know now the program of our lives and how to carry it out. *Credo.* With a grateful heart we accept all that God has revealed and holy Church proposes for our belief.

III. The Life of Union.

Union is made perfect in charity, in the love of friendship, it is the *cor unum et anima una* between Jesus and the soul. The object of Christ's mission was the glory of the Father through the salvation of men, and this His mission is perpetuated in the Holy Eucharist. Union with Jesus then will mean that we unite ourselves with Him in His eucharistic mission, to live and work and die for the same ends for which He lived and died, namely to glorify God through the salvation and sanctification of souls; first our own and then the souls of others. Following the structure of the Mass, the progress of this life of union presents itself in four stages: the oblation and sanctification of ourselves in the prayers of the Offertory up to the Sanctus; the union with Jesus in his prayers before the sacrifice, in the first part of the Canon; union with Jesus in his death and the offering of sacrifice, in the second part of the Canon; union with Jesus in the new life of the children of God in the Communion service of the Mass, from the *Pater noster* to the last orations.

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[3] Heb. 1:1-2.

[4] John 13:15.

The Offertory.

The Offertory consists of the oblation and sanctification of the sacrificial gifts of bread, and together with them of our own persons. They will be changed into the body and the blood of Jesus Christ. In and with Jesus we will offer ourselves in sacrifice.

The substitution of Jesus as the victim in our place does not exempt us from the obligation of being victims, but rather emphasizes it. The choice of the sacrificial elements as well as the prayers accompanying their offering well express the intentions of the Divine Victim. We try to make them our own and offer ourselves for their realization.

The Host.

The very name is significant. *Hostia* means victim, the animal slain in sacrifice. Jesus was *hostia* in the literal sense of the word, when He died upon the cross. The wheaten bread on the altar will be changed into the very same body of Jesus which hung on the cross.

This host is now bread, and the appearance of bread will remain after the consecration. Thus the body of Jesus is offered to us as the bread of life. It will be consumed in Communion and thus is expressed in the most perfect manner the reconciliation between God and man, brought about by the death of Christ.

The choice of bread suggests a very practical feature in our participation in the Mass. A long and laborious process is necessary to produce bread. Does this not remind us of the sentence pronounced on our first parents; " Cursed is the earth in thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy Life. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. . . . In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread, till thou return to the earth out of which thou wast taken; for dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." [5] The toil and hardship of labor as the punishment of sin is our personal, daily share in the sacrifice of atonement.

If then I understand the meaning of the host, I will offer myself to carry with patience and resignation the mortification of my daily vocational work, the dislike I feel for the duties imposed upon me, the hardships and disappointments that accompany it. I too want to be a *hostia,* to be worn out by doing the will of God in atonement for having done my will in sin.

The mixing of the wine and water.

Wine signifies the divine, and water the human nature. Both were united in the person to a participation in the divine nature, not in the same, yet in a very real, manner. The drop of water in the wine, where is it? It cannot be seen or tasted, and yet it is there because no chemical change has taken place. Our nature, when united with God, is a drop in the infinite ocean of the divine life. It partakes of the divine nature, yet does not cease to be what it is, a distinct, created being. This union with God is the fruit of Christ's sacrifice. Some reflexions on sanctifying grace, or the indwelling of God in the soul, would fit here very naturally.

The wine.

Wine is the second sacrificial element. The separate consecration of bread and wine is to represent the separation of the body and the blood of Jesus in His death on the cross. The bloody death of our Saviour was to be the price of our redemption: " and without the shedding of blood, there is no remission of sin ".[6] A violent death, impressively recalls the violent separation of the soul from God in sin.

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[5] Gen. 3:17-19.

[6] Heb. 9:22.

A violent death on the cross, a death in shame and disgrace suffered by the God-man to atone for the sins of man: is it not folly? A consideration of the nature of wine will answer the question. Wine is an intoxicating beverage; intemperate use of it brings about the state of intoxication and makes a man act foolishly, like an irrational being. Yet a greater folly than drunkenness is sin. Sin is rebellion against God, a culpable forfeiture of our heavenly inheritance, a reckless exposure of our souls to the danger of eternal damnation. This incredible folly has changed this earth into the land of exile and the valley of tears. Yet sin is committed through an inordinate attachment to or intemperate use of creatures.

The folly of sin has been atoned by the folly of love. To be drunk with love is an idiom found in every language. The all-exceeding love of Jesus became manifest in the humiliations of his passion and the disgrace of the cross. The cross has been "a folly to the gentiles and a scandal to the Jews". In sin there is self-love to complete forgetfulness of God; it is atoned by the love of God to the complete forgetfulness of self.

So I resolve to become foolish in the eyes of the world, then I may be wise in the sight of God and by the folly of the cross atone for the folly of sin. Gladly will I suffer humiliations and injustices and glory in my infirmities that the power of God may dwell in me, even though the world esteems the life of the servants of God as madness and their end without honor. Blood of Christ, inebriate me!

In spiritu humilitatis.

Humbled in mind, contrite of heart, crushed, overwhelmed by the realization of the degradation which sin has brought upon us, we offer ourselves, to be made part of the sacrifice. We know now that what we offer is nothing to be proud of, that we do no favor to God by our oblation; but that the favor is all on the side of God, when He accepts our oblation. In connexion with this and the preceding prayer the nature and practice of humility may be spoken of, especially humility in performing good works. There is great danger of vanity, of self-complacency in the good we do, even among otherwise good and well-meaning persons.

Veni Sanctificator.

The offering of the gifts is followed by their sanctification. It is in keeping with the idea of the act; in point of fact, it is generally practised in regard to material things offered to God; for example, vestments, vessels, etc. If they are to be used for the exclusive service of God, they are blessed, made sacred by the prayers of the Church, to be prepared for the purpose intended.

The Holy Ghost is the sanctifier. He has given us the Divine High Priest and Victim in the mystery of the Incarnation and has sanctified Him for His mission. It follows that the same Holy Spirit must sanctify us. In fact, He has already done so more remotely in Baptism and in Confirmation, through ordination in the case of the priest, through holy vows in the case of religious. He can make up for the shortcomings of which we have been guilty in the past, and increase our fitness for the sacrifice now before us. The sacrifice is said to be prepared for His Holy Name. His name is love, and love celebrates its greatest triumphs upon the altar. May it be fanned into a consuming flame in our hearts, so that the personal sacrifices of our daily lives may willingly be added to the eucharistic sacrifice.—The invocation offers a good opportunity to dwell on the necessity of grace in order to practise the spirit of sacrifice in the hardships and disappointments of life.

Lavabo.

We must coöperate with the Holy Spirit in the work of our sanctification. The psalm Lavabo gives expression to our firm purpose of amendment, our determination to avoid sin in the future. In the mysteries of the altar lies the source of strength necessary for carrying out this resolution. The Holy Spirit, giving us a deeper realization of the significance of these mysteries, will inspire us with a great love for the altar and for the house of God. We love the glory of His house and the place where His glory dwelleth.

A splendid opportunity is here presented for practical reflexions on the beauty of the house of God and the interest which priest and people must have in it. I must be as worthy as circumstances allow; very particularly, cleanliness, decoration, divine services should be according to the mind and will of the Church. The beauty of the house of God will attract the faithful and edify them.

Suscipe, sancta Trinitas.

The sacrificial gifts of bread and wine as well as our persons having been sanctified, there follows another offering, addressed to the Blessed Trinity. The prayer emphasizes the relation of the Eucharistic sacrifice to the Passion, the Resurrection and the Ascension of Jesus Christ. These three mysteries are inseparable from the Mass. In them we see the norm according to which we are to pass from the death of sin to the glory of children of God. As we lift up our eyes to the Blessed Trinity, we see it surrounded by the throngs of saints; they now possess what we hope to attain. We honor their memory at Mass, thanking God for what He has done for them. The saints, on their part, will intercede for us that we may remain faithful to the oblation we made of ourselves in the offering of the sacrificial elements.

Mention may be made here of the sign of the cross and the Gloria Patri. Both remind us of the blessings we owe to each of the Three Divine Persons, and may very fittingly be used to renew the oblation which we made at Mass.

Orate Fratres.

The oblation of the sacrificial gifts and of our persons has come to an end in the preceding prayer. There remains nothing else to be done but to pray that God may accept it. Forcibly this little exhortation puts before us the object of our life and our sacrifice: the praise and glory of His Holy Name, the well being of His Church, our spiritual interests. Small and narrow are so many Christians in their prayers and good works, in their whole outlook on life: their own interests, and mostly their material interests stand in the foreground, and the truly great and all important interests of God and the Church are given no attention or pushed into the background. More prayer is needed to promote the glory of God and the cause of the Church.—Prayer is continued in the *Secreta* and thus the holy action progresses amid prayer.

TRANSITION—PREFACE AND SANCTUS.

Preface.

There follows now a brief consideration of the excellence of the sacrifice which we are about to offer up and of the majesty of God to whom it is offered. It is truly just and meet, right and profitable to give thanks at all times and at all places by offering up the clean oblation, foretold by the prophet Malachy. Yet, though we contribute toward this sacrifice, and in a very real sense offer sacrifice, we know that we can do it only through Jesus. He is the one Divine Priest of the New Testament. To Him we now lift up our hearts and minds, we rise in spirit higher and higher to the very throne of God Himself, where we behold Him at the right hand of the Father, surrounded by myriads of angels and saints and acclaimed by them as true God, equal to the Father and the Holy Ghost.

Sanctus.

We join the acclamations of the heavenly spirits as they, without ceasing, cry out, Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God of hosts. Heaven and earth are full of His glory. In heaven the angels and saints proclaim His glory in their never-ending happiness; on earth: "The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands."[6] Yet all the glory of nature fades into nothingness when compared with the glory of Calvary and the altar. Again, this glory is to shine forth in this place. Amid scenes of such splendor we surround, so to say, the person of our Divine High Priest to conduct Him to the altar, that He may continue the glory of His sacrifice in our midst.

Benedictus.

Blessed is He who cometh in the name of the Lord. He comes in the name of the Lord, because He is sent by the Father and clothed with the authority and power of God. Blessed is He by the Father and the Holy Ghost, for never was there a greater work undertaken for the honor of God. Blessed is He by the saints in heaven, for all their glory is due to Him; blessed by the faithful on earth, by all men of good will, for through Him alone can they be saved. Hail to Thee, who comest from the highest!

[6] Is. 18:1.

This meditation has great similarity with the meditation of St. Ignatius on Christ, the King. What a king and leader Jesus is in His Eucharistic sacrifice! He is the mighty God, and the splendor of the divinity shines from His face. Though meek and humble, concealed beneath the eucharistic species, He has come forth like a giant and conquered the world. There is no defeat in His way; victory is assured. Will it then be hard to submit to the hardships of following Him? "As the Lord liveth and as the Lord, my King, liveth, in what place soever there will his servant be."[7] What will be the joy of the faithful followers of Christ, when on the last day they shall behold him coming on the clouds of heaven with great power and majesty! Then there will go up from the throngs of the saints the last *Benedictus*: Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord. Hosanna in the highest!

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[7] 2 Kings 15:21.

[TO BE CONTINUED IN JUNE NUMBER.]

Studies and Conferences

Questions, the discussion of which is for the information of the general reader of the Department of Studies and Conferences, are answered in the order in which they reach us. The Editor cannot engage to reply to inquiries by private letter.

SUNDAY MASS AND THE PARISH CHURCH.

Many text books of theology do not even touch a problem that must harass many pastors nowadays, when the need for knowing our flocks and being known by them is greater than ever before. The problem rises from what I consider an erroneous interpretation of canon 1249, which says: " Legi de audiendo Sacro satisfacit qui Missae adest quocumque catholico ritu celebretur, sub dio aut in quacunque ecclesia vel oratorio publico aut semi-publico," etc. No one questions that decree, identical with one issued by Pope Leo XIII long before the Code. Opinions certainly differ, however, about the conclusions to be drawn from the abolition of the ancient law compelling Catholics to assist at Sunday Mass in their own parish church. My conclusion and opinion is clear from what I write, and I wish to know whether or not it is tenable.

The situation that I describe exists in many old-established parishes, but I happen to be in charge of a newly-formed quasi-parish, with a strictly defined territory. Of the 650 members of the parish, practically every one, even on the extreme boundaries, resides closer to the new church than to any other. Many families, and nearly all the most distant ones, have motor cars. Bus and tram (street-car) routes, asphalt streets, pavements, good suburban roads, and all the facilities of a large modern city abound. Very few persons need to walk far to Mass, although the furthermost home is between three and four miles away. The great majority of the people live within a few blocks, or not more than a mile and a half from the church.

These details make it clear that all the faithful can "commode" attend the parish church. None of the people are canonically exempt from my jurisdiction except a few Syrians of the

Maronite rite who, however, are allowed to hear Mass and receive the sacraments of Penance and Holy Eucharist here. A house-to-house canvass was made in the territory while the church was under construction, and my assistant and I have kept the census up-to-date by visiting every home from one to six times since the church was opened fourteen months ago. We have done all in our power to know our sheep, but many of the flock still refuse to be known, still refuse to acknowledge their pastor. They say that they go to some other church on Sunday, and intend to continue so doing.

Now, these people belong to one of four categories: (1) many of them are prevaricators, for we priests know that they do not often, if ever, attend any church; (2) some say that they prefer to go to the church which they have attended for so many years; (3) a few will not affiliate with the new parish because, *protestantice*, they think that the bishop should have consulted the laity about the new church; and (4) a certain number do not seem to like the pastor, or his methods of administration (all approved by the bishop in writing); and this dislike is evinced by those who have never come into close contact either with the pastor or with his burdens.

Without exception, all parishioners of these four categories hold that they are free to go to any church, and by hearing Mass elsewhere they are free from any sin. Those who actually do not go to any church, as well as those who do, defend their "right" to attended *any* church *in perpetuum*. There are priests who uphold the claims of such Catholics, and thus add fuel to the fire of what I would call their recusancy. But, whether dealing with conditions in a new parish or in an old one, can we agree with this interpretation of canon 1249? Are we to conclude that the only *parochial* obligation of Catholics is "sustentare parochum"?—which, of course, none of the people that I have mentioned ever dream of doing! Are there not *corporate* duties which, in the aggregate, impose a binding obligation?

A parish is evidently established for more easily supplying the people with all the helps of religion, *especially Holy Mass*, and for enabling those living within the limits of the territory to practise their religion with less difficulty. If *anyone* is free at all times to go elsewhere for Mass and the ministrations of religion (I do not refer to confession), then *everyone* enjoys the same liberty; and if members of a flock accordingly need not recognize their shepherd or any obligation toward the sheepfold, is not the establishment of a parish futile, and the appointment of a pastor nugatory? If the unit of Catholic Action is the parish, and if Catholic Action is not only necessary but ecclesiastically imposed upon us nowadays, how can there be effective Catholic Action if parishioners are to be deemed altogether exempt from participation? If recourse to the parish church and pastor are obligatory so often in life, in sickness, and in death, must there be no other contacts with them under the aspects of voluntary docility, loyalty, and affection?

Surely canon 1249 cannot be interpreted as conferring a right, or even affording a pretext, for nullifying other ecclesiastical laws, or for militating against the very notion and purpose of parochial organization! There are not lacking explicit enactments, implications, and moral obligations that impose definite *corporate* duties on the members of a parish. They are presumed to hear and heed the Sunday announcements, the publication of banns, the promulgation of parochial regulations, etc. As one of your most eminent episcopal correspondents said in THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW for August, 1932, the idea of a parish conveys a " group " idea; " the individuals involved have a common life, . . . there are activities, problems, needs, virtues, defects which are the result of this community of interests; . . . these become the concern of the group ". Besides the obligation of hearing Sunday Mass, therefore, what about the obligation of good example, of fraternal charity, of active coöperation, of uniting for the defence and advancement of the Faith? Can these, or will these, duties be performed by those who habitually attend other churches and never affiliate with their own parish? Not a single one of the duties that I have mentioned has been performed in this parish by any one of the individuals in my four categories. As a consequence, the parish has suffered notable injury.

Having such conditions in mind, no doubt, Tanquerey concludes his exposition of the First Precept of the Church with these words: "Attamen omnino suadenda est assistentia missae parochiali, ut oves suum pastorem agnoscant et Verbum Dei audiant." [1] Dealing with the same precept, Micheletti says in his admirable work, *De Pastore* (p. 481): "ad moralem praecepti finem plenius assequendum, ut in quantum fieri potest, in paroeciae ecclesia, et quidem, missae paroeciali intersint fideles quam maxime adhortandi." Even the Code of Canon Law, immediately after enumerating the chief duties of pastors, implies that the faithful have correlative obligations, for it says (can. 467 § 2): "Monendi sunt fideles ut frequenter, ubi commode id fieri possit, ad suas paroeciales ecclesias accedant ibique divinis officiis intersint et Verbum Dei audiant."

Therefore, I submit the following difficulties for your solution:

Qu. 1. Does not canon 1249 merely refer to a *hic et nunc* case, meaning simply, if one has assisted at Sunday Mass anywhere, he has complied with the First Precept of the Church?

Qu. 2. Does that canon imply, much less assert, that Catholics are free *always* to *seek* some other church besides their own parish church in which to assist at Sunday Mass?

Qu. 3. Does that canon even contemplate the performance of a *parochial* duty? Does it not concern itself with the individual *as a Catholic*, rather than as a member of a parish?

Qu. 4. Do the words of Tanquerey, Micheletti, and canon 467 § 2, that I have quoted above, imply that the faithful, nevertheless, may persistently refuse to heed these exhortations and still do no wrong?

Qu. 5. Is not the practice of *always* attending another church and refusing to affiliate with one's own parish *sinful*, for the following reasons: (a) because it is a deordination and abuse; (b) because it is tantamount to resisting episcopal and pastoral authority; (c) because it is opposed to the group idea and common life of a parish; (d) because it invariably leads to the neglect of all the corporate duties of Catholics, and injures the delinquents spiritually; (e) because it is contrary to the law of Christian charity—that charity which flows from unity, universal association, fraternal affection, good example, mutual assistance and encouragement; that charity which promotes the temporal and spiritual interests of the parish and of all its members, by means of enthusiastic devotion, loyalty, and coöperation; that charity which alone can generate the spirit necessary for the defence and progress of the Faith?

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[1] *Theol. Mor.*, II, p. 603.

Qu. 6. If persistent refusal to attend one's own church *frequenter*, and to affiliate with one's own parish, *is sinful*, for the enumerated reasons or for any other reasons, would the person who failed to respond to exhortation incur the guilt of *mortal* sin?

A SOUTH-AFRICAN QUASI-PAROCHUS.

Reply.

1. Canon 1249 states in clear and unmistakable terms that one who assists at Mass in any church, public oratory, semi-public oratory or even in a private chapel in a cemetery as described in canon 1190, on Sundays and holidays of obligation fulfils his duty of hearing Mass on these days.

2. Canon 1249 gives all the faithful the fullest liberty to satisfy their Sunday obligation in any of the above-mentioned churches or oratories: it places no limit as to the frequency with which they may make use of that liberty.

3. Canon 1249 contemplates only the place where Catholics can fulfil their obligation of assisting at Mass on Sundays and holidays. Assistance at Mass on these days is not a " parochial duty ".

4. Canon 467 § 2 imposes no obligation whatsoever to fulfil the duty under discussion in one's parish church: it simply makes an exhortation to that effect. Failure to heed the exhortation does not entail any guilt. As no obligation is imposed, none is violated. Therefore both Tanquerey and Micheletti are correct when they speak only of an exhortation without implying any obligation.

5. This is an intriguing question to which as it stands neither an unqualified affirmative nor an unqualified negative answer would be quite correct. The question concerns two matters which are not necessarily united, and they should be considered separately. Let us state the question as follows:

A. Is the regular assistance at Mass on Sundays and holidays in a church other than one's own parish church, sinful?

The answer is no. There is no canon that imposes any obligation of fulfilling that duty in one's own parish church; on the contrary, canon 1249 gives everyone the fullest liberty of acquitting himself of that obligation by assisting at Mass in any church, public oratory, semi-public oratory or a private chapel in a cemetery. In particular:

(a) Such a practice is not a deordination in the sense of wrong-doing. One does not sin by failure to do a thing that is only *advised*, not prescribed.

(b) It is not tantamount to resisting episcopal or pastoral authority. Neither bishop nor pastor has the power to prescribe that the faithful fulfil their obligation of Sunday Mass only or regularly or frequently in their own parish church. Canon 1249 gives the faithful in this regard the fullest liberty, and neither the bishop nor the pastor can lawfully abridge a universal law. Canon 335 § 1 ordains that bishops have the right and the duty to govern their dioceses, but it immediately adds, " in accordance with the sacred canons " (" ad normam sacrorum canonum "). Vermeersch-Creusen in interpreting this canon state: " Potestate legislativa episcopus potest condere statuta, etiam perpetua *praeter* ius commune, . . . Episcopus nihil *contra* ius commune decernere potest, . . ." [1]

(c) " The group idea and common life of a parish " impose no such obligation as the question would indicate. The former are fully provided for in the Code, which nevertheless does not impose an obligation. On the contrary, in canon 1249 it grants a liberty which no one can lawfully curtail without leave of the Holy See.

(d) While one does not feel compelled to agree with our inquirer's use of the word " invariably," there is truth in his assertion that members of a parish who do not assist at Mass in their own parish church " neglect " some " of the corporate duties of Catholics." But, this neglect is not to be corrected by a course of action in defiance of the laws of the Church. If absenting oneself from one's parish church injures the parishioner spiritually, other means will be available to repair his spiritual loss without the pastor himself violating the law of the Church and restricting the liberty of the faithful. To apply the term " delinquents " to those who do not hear Sunday Mass in their own parish church, but who otherwise fulfil their obligation of assisting at Mass on Sundays and holidays, would be unjust.

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[1] *Epitome Iuris Canonici,* tomus I (5 ed., Mechliniae: H. Dessain, 1933), n. 450, 1. Cf. also S.C.C., 19 February, 1921—*A.A.S.*, XIII (1921), 228-230. In this resolution the liberty of priests to transfer superfluous manual stipends to priests of other dioceses without the consent of the ordinary was maintained in conformity with canon 838 against a contrary statute of a provincial council, though the reply upheld the statute in as far as it concerned other stipends that do not fall within the compass of canon 838.—N. B. In the question submitted by our inquirer there is no mention of any episcopal ordinance. No ordinary would consider enacting any regulation that would conflict with the sacred canons.

(e) What our inquirer says here has little bearing on the question as to *where* the faithful are to fulfil their duty of assisting at Mass on Sundays and holidays of obligation.

B. Is not the refusal to affiliate with one's own parish sinful?

This is a point that must be kept distinct from the other, as to the place where the faithful must hear Mass on Sundays and holidays. In this latter respect they enjoy a wide choice. In regard to the former they are not free to affiliate with any parish of their choice, but belong to the one established by the ordinary for the district where they reside. The pastor of this parish has rights in their regard which they may not deny; he has duties toward them which he dare not refuse.

It should be borne in mind that, even though the fullest coöperation of all the members of a parish in every parochial undertaking is desirable, nevertheless there are few matters in which the entire coöperation of every member is a strict duty. A pastor should not let his zeal run away with him and demand under pain of sin some things which cannot be proved to be of such obligation. It is because our inquirer has not kept these several distinctions in mind that he would see strict duty under pain of sin where there is no certain obligation.

6. Here again the same distinction holds as for the fifth question. One who hears Mass on Sundays and holidays of obligation in any church, public oratory, semi-public oratory or the private chapel in a cemetery fulfils his duty in this matter and cannot be justly accused of sinning in this regard.

The guilt of those who do not affiliate with their parish will depend upon the gravity of the duty refused. Not every parish undertaking imposes a duty in conscience upon each parishioner. Neither does every duty incumbent upon the parish as a whole, in every instance oblige every parishioner in particular under pain of mortal sin. If the essentials of any necessary parish activity are accomplished through the efforts of some of the parishioners, the others can scarcely be accused of grievous sin for their neglect.

"ALTER" IN THE "ALTER CHRISTUS" PHRASES.

To the Editor, THE ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW.

In the April issue of the REVIEW, Fr. Stemmler, S.J., gave us some illustrations of the way in which theologians appear to have "altered" (if I may attempt a slight pun in a sober discussion) patristic phraseology by the insertion of "alter" before "Christus". He was inclined to think that the "crystallization" of patristic thought thus effected in the now universally used phrases was post-patristic in origin.

"Crystallization" is a happy word. For true it is that the two phrases are crystalline in their brevity and their startling beauty. It is therefore not strange that one author communicated to me his intention of publishing a volume on the priesthood under the engaging title of "Sacerdos alter Christus". Neither is it strange that the learned Bishop Stockums, the English translation of whose work bears the simple title, "The Priesthood" (Herder, 1938, 245 pp.), should *begin* his second chapter ("The Essence and Purpose of the Priesthood") with the words "Sacerdos alter Christus" in italics. However, he forthwith adds: "This *ancient* [italics mine] and venerable phrase expresses both a fact and a counsel." In the first of his two encyclicals on the priesthood, Pius X commented briefly on the "fact" and the "counsel", but did not say that the phrase was "ancient". He was content to remark, "ut dicitur," without ascribing it to any Father or even to a post-patristic source. The phrase is "venerable" both as a fact and as a counsel. But our present question remains: "Is it *ancient?*" "Christianus alter Christus" has been traced back only to the year 1611; "Sacerdos alter Christus", only to about the middle of the seventeenth century, and even thus only in French and in the plural number ("autres Jésus-Christ"). It appears to be equally significant that Bishop Stockums, in his Section entitled "Testimonies of the Fathers and the Church" (pp. 217-222), nowhere includes our phrase.

Fr. Stemmler's thought is shared by the latest contributor (who wishes to remain anonymous). His letter to me now follows.

Dear Monsignor Henry:

Your hunt for the source of " Alter Christus " has been leading your readers a merry chase this past year, and so far they really cannot seem to go back beyond 1611, the date of the work of de la Puenta (*E. R.*, August, 1937). I have spent almost fifteen to twenty hours since your search began: and no results. Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, have been ransacked in vain for the words, though the doctrine is certainly there. St. Augustine has two passages that might be added to those already given:

> Et exaltabit cornu Christi sui. Quomodo Christus exaltabit cornu Christi sui? . . . Quis ergo est Christus Christi sui? An cornu exaltabit uniuscujusque fidelis sui . . .? Omnes quippe unctos ejus christmate, recte Christos possumus dicere: quod tamen totum cum suo capite corpus unum est Christus.[1]
>
> Nolite tangere Christos meos . . . Unde ergo illi jam tunc Christi appellabantur? . . . An ideo Christi, quia etiamsi latentur, jam tamen Christiani? [2]

Quite recently I found the following in the meditations of St. Anselm: " Quanta celsitudo est Christianum hominem sic in Christo proficere, ut et ipse quodamodo Christus dicatur? " [3]

Like Father Kemmerer (February 1937), I have found seventeenth-century references. Cornelius a Lapide uses " alter quasi Christus " in regard to Christians in general, and " Christum exprimes, Christus eris " [4] He too refers to St. Gregory of Nyssa, not to the work " quoted " by de la Puenta,[5] but to " De professione nominis Christiani " [6] as containing this: " Christianus ergo est quasi alter Christus. Vivat ergo quasi alter Christus ".[7] The same quotation is given in the Albrizzi edition (4ª), 1703; and is used most likely by the author in the original seventeenth-century edition.

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[1] *De Civ. Dei,* XVII, 4 9; *Pl.* xxxviii, col. 532.

[2] *Enarratio in Ps. CIV,* n. 10; *Pl.* xxxv, col. 1395. Migne uses a small c, the Caillau edition (Paris, 1835-1842) a capital *C,* for Christi and Christos.

[3] *Meditat.* I, n. 5, *Pl.* clviii, col. 713.

[4] *In Ep. ad Rom.*, c. 13, v. 14, tom. XVIII (Vivès), p. 226b. Both phrases are used without quotation marks.

[5] Puenta: Homilia de perfecta forma hominis Christiani. (Feb. and April, 1937.)

[6] Migne: Quid nomen professiove Christiani sibi velit.

[7] *In Ecclum.,* c. 36, n. 14, tom. X, p. 236a.

But a careful scrutiny of the works of St. Gregory fails to locate the passage á Lapide quotes. Quite evidently he is giving it *juxta sensum* only. The doctrine is there in full, and quite beautifully expressed.

I trust that someone will finally locate the patristic source of the expressions, though I am practically convinced now that they are of a later date, the doctrine alone being found in the tomes of Migne.

Yours for a most successful hunt,
In Christo Rege,
" DETROITER."

In another letter to me, " Detroiter " adds:

Dear Monsignor Henry:

Pardon this rather inexcusable delay in answering your welcome letter of last week. In the meantime, I was doing a bit more research work.

I wish you would add a third quotation from Saint Augustine, to the two which I had in my last letter. This one may be more to the point:

> Gratulemur et agamus gratias, non solum nos christianos factos esse, sed Christum. . . . Gaudete, Christus facti sumus. Si enim caput ille, nos membra; totus homo, ille et nos.[8]

Furthermore, I think that I should add another sentence to the quotation from St. Anselm, so that the whole would read:

> Quanta celsitudo est Christianum hominem sic in Christo proficere, ut et ipse quodamodo Christus dicatur? Quod ille vere fidelis dispensator ecclesiasticae familiae sensit, qui dixit: Omnes Christiani in Christo unus Christus sumus.[9]

These quotations, of course, have reference only to the phrase " Christianus alter Christus ". I have been unable to locate any that would directly recall " Sacerdos alter Christus ".

Thanking you for your kind encouragement,
I remain,
Yours in our Lady (March 25),
" DETROITER."

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[8] *In Joan.,* Tract. xxi, c. 5, n. 8, *PL.* xxxiv, col. 1568.

[9] *Medit.* I, n. 5, PL. clviii, col. 713-14.

SACERDOTAL SALESMANSHIP. III.

THE SALT AND LEAVEN OF THE GREAT MINISTRY.

The first ingredient of all our endeavors should be conviction. We should feel and act at all times in such a manner, no matter what we do, that people can sense our sincerity. If we believe, we must make others believe that we believe. They listen to our attitude rather than to our words. Simple sincerity is the esperanto in which any message becomes understandable to all.

A Model T. Ford stopped in front of the rectory. A dapper little fellow jumped out. He was dressed in a neat, cheap fabric suit; he wore shining, half-soled shoes. With a beaming smile he approached me.

" Father, would you do me a great favor? "

" What? "

" I would like to address your Mothers' Club meeting, only for five minutes, and tell them about the new-brand aluminum pots and pans now on the market."

Although it was the last meeting of the season with a crowded agenda list, I weakened at his irresistible approach and asked the ladies whether they wanted to listen to him.

They in turn " fell " for the young man and he was given ten minutes before the meeting to explain himself. He started in plainest language by making excuse for breaking in on their important meeting: said they would never realize how much he appreciated this kindness and how grateful he was for the opportunity, inasmuch as he was well aware of the fact that, in addressing this particular club, composed of high-class, intelligent women (the truth), he would be benefited and helped considerably in spreading the glad tidings of this new kitchen equipment. His article positively excelled anything of the kind on the market before. It made cooking cooler and kept the vitamins of food. Indeed a blessing and a God-send to humanity! Of course, on account of its excellence, it cost more than ordinary aluminum sets. He was not disparaging anybody's merchandise: he only wanted to make it clear that his article was better, hence more valuable. But what did a little more money amount to, when it meant the protection and preservation of God's priceless gift—health?

"Pardon me, ladies, for injecting something personal," he beamed on. "I am married a little over a year. We have a baby. My wife does all the housework. I am a substitute high-school teacher and have to work during vacation to keep the wolf from the door. So you can readily understand there is no spare cash lying about in my home. Nevertheless, by scraping and stinting, I saved enough to acquire one of these sets, for I really felt I owed it to my young wife."

He then proceeded to picture in touching words what this acquisition of pots and pans had meant to the happiness and health of his little family. When his ten minutes were up, he had a few women almost in tears, sold three sets, and, by unanimous vote of the club, was promised coöperation in spreading the news of the dawn of a brighter day for hard-pressed housewives.

After the meeting I went into the church and, kneeling before the tabernacle, I asked the Master to inspire me, His priest and salesman, with at least as much enthusiasm for His cause, as was displayed by this little drummer of aluminum pots and pans. Yes, and for as much wisdom in words too.

The reason I have expatiated on this story is to bring out points of salesmanship which we priests may well study and practise in bringing the best of all blessings—religion itself—to the people.

In his introduction the drummer had a pleasing approach. He was properly groomed and wore a big smile. He expressed himself as sincerely happy to meet people. He was deeply appreciative of a favor done. He praised people with feeling, no foul flattery. He made his prospective customers like him from the start.

He gave the impression that he believed in his wares and in their value to all possible purchasers. He never even hinted that he wanted to sell something in order that he could collect commissions. How wise in their generation are the children of men! No; he was frankly interested in others, however subtly in himself.

He did not tear down or criticize: he only compared values, and made his hearers want to buy.

If by our daily words and deeds we convince people of our earnestness as priests, our better ambitions will not be long thwarted. Sincerity is the salt and leaven of our success.

ARE GENTLEMAN AND PRIEST ANALOGOUS?

Years ago I passed a group of boys playing on a vacant lot. I hailed them:

" Hello there, fellows ". One little lad shouted back a kind of fresh—

" Hello there yourself, Mister." Another boy corrected him in a stage whisper:

" Shut up, Freddie; that isn't a gentleman, he's a priest."

Since then I have occasionally wondered whether sometimes there isn't a little truth to that boy's would-be compliment that went awry.

Of course, all priests are *in se* gentlemen; but do we always act like it? Do we not sometimes take it for granted that people ought to feel convinced that we are gentlemen, even if we do not exactly act the part?

Yet us analyze, apply, and estimate Cardinal Newman's famous definition. " Gentleman is one who never inflicts pain. . . . He carefully avoids all clashing of opinion or collision of feeling, all restraint or suspicion or gloom or resentment, his great concern being to make everyone at home, at ease. . . . He recollects to whom he is speaking, he guards against unreasonable allusions and topics that may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome. . . . He never defends himself by a mere retort; he has no ears for slander and gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or bitter in his disputes, never takes an unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. . . . Nowhere shall we find greater candor, consideration, indulgence. He throws himself into the minds of his opponents: he accounts for their mistakes."

What do you think of it?

In regard to our brother priests alone and even our Bishop, do we not often have to strike our breast in a sincere *mea culpa?* Especially in their respect, we so often act, speak and behave as if the virtue of charity, " the greatest of them all," is supposed to be on a holiday.

There are close to two billion people in the world and only 682 million express some kind of belief in Jesus Christ. It should make a priest shudder for his guilt when he thinks: " I, little miserable I, by the frustration of my Saviour's wish, may make some of the one-and-one-fourth billion non-believers in Christ, my Master, doubt the truth of the Catholic Church. " By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another " (St. John 13:35) should haunt us.

And why should we speak uncharitably of others? Positively not to please God or advance His kingdom. To be sure, we do not do it out of malice or ill will, but simply because selfishness, conceit and jealousy make us forget ourselves.

Jesus abhors this fault in us, condemns it, and some day will damn us, if we persist in our uncharitably critical attitude toward our confrères.

Let us, furthermore, not overlook this fact: that whatever wrong we say about a brother priest, it will reflect to our own personal discredit, for thus we malign our profession and our partners. When we think out loud as to a moral wrong in one of the priesthood, we deliberately lay ourselves open to the conclusion that we ourselves are the type that is or could be guilty of such a thing, by believing it of another. This may be false reasoning; but it does not take away the fact that lay people figure and conclude that way.

What can we gain by a lack of gentlemanliness in thought, word and deed toward our fellow priest? Absolutely no good at all. It hurts us; it makes him sad and despondent, it displeases God and retards His work. Lay Catholics detest it, and it affects and lessens their faith. Non-Catholics nurse doubts, and resist the inspiration to consider the claims of the true Church. This bad trait of character will minimize our priestly effectiveness to a terrible degree, and lay low the highest of priestly ideals.

We must develop a habit of always speaking kindly of our brother priest. If he has made a mistake, let us show him charitable sympathy and find excuses for him with the thought in mind which was expressed on seeing a disgraced man in a crowded street: " There but for the grace of God, go I." This attitude will help us with God and men.

PETER M. H. WYNHOVEN

New Orleans, Louisiana.

THE WOMAN WHOM THOU GAVEST ME TO BE MY COMPANION.

Septuagesima again brought the Book of Genesis into our daily office, and with it the story of the fall of Adam and Eve, with its dire consequences for the whole of mankind. Again, also, came the old question, the old question which continues to vex the minds of many, especially of those who do not share the certainty of our faith: " Why should such a trivial matter as eating an apple be punished so severely? "

We may explain why the matter is not at all trivial, quoting St. Augustine and many theologians. But, " to eat an apple " will appear trivial for all that. I fear it is impossible to satisfy the doubting unless we find both a Scriptural and a human explanation of why it was that Adam decided to eat of the tree from which Eve had already eaten.

Genesis 3: 12 seems to give a satisfactory answer to the question, why Adam decided to eat the forbidden fruit. " The woman, whom thou gavest me to be my companion, gave me of the tree, and I did eat." In these words we have Adam's own attempt to justify his disobedience. His sole justification is his reference to the woman whom God Himself had given to Adam to be his permanent companion. It appears as if Adam wishes to insinuate that God Himself is partly responsible for what has happened.

The following imaginary colloquy between God and Adam seeks to bring out clearly and forcibly the complete deliberateness of Adam's decision, his sorrow and restoration to grace, and the promise of the Redeemer. If others have explained the fall of Adam in this same manner, I have no knowledge of it.

God. " Thou hast eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat " (Gen. 3: 11).

Adam. " The woman, whom thou gavest me to be my companion, gave me of the tree, and I did eat " (Gen. 3: 12).

God. I commanded thee, saying: " Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shall eat of it, thou shalt die the death." Why didst thou not obey my commandment?

Adam. The woman had eaten of the forbidden tree. She dreaded thy punishment. She feared she alone would be punished. She pleaded with me, long, that I should share her fate. At last, with complete deliberation, I determined not to desert her. I, too, ate of the forbidden tree.

"Lord, we are sorry that we are offending thee. Punish us as thou wilt, but, please, do not separate us.

"Lord, thou knowest why I determined to stand by the woman. Didst thou not give the woman to me to be my companion? Among all thy creatures she is the only real companion I have. How, then, could I leave her? Didst thou not say, 'It is not good for man to be alone.' Surely, neither is it good for woman to be alone. Is the woman not a part of me? Is she not bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh? Didst thou not command us two to increase and multiply? Didst thou not command that man shall cleave to his wife?

"Lord, I know I am guilty of deliberately disregarding Thy will. I deliberately beg for Thy just punishment. But, Lord, please do not separate us. Let us bear the burden together, whatsoever it may be.

"And, Lord, let us remain Thy children, nevertheless. Be not angry forever."

God. Thou hast deliberately made thy choice. Thy just punishment thou shalt have. "Because thou hast harkened (not to My voice, but) to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat, cursed is the earth in thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herbs of the earth. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth, out of which thou wast taken; for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return."

God. Didst thou hear what I said to the serpent?

Adam. Yea, Lord. That someone shall crush the serpent's head.

God. Forget not these words.

Adam. Thank thee, O Lord. Thank thee, O Lord.

And the Lord made for Adam and his wife garments of skin, and clothed them (with sanctifying grace). And He cast them out of paradise.

EDWARD DAHMUS.

Mount Vernon, Illinois.

AUTHORITY OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN A PARISH.

Qu. 1. Has the major superior of a community the authority to order the recitation of prayers in the public or parish churches under his jurisdiction without consulting the local ordinary?

2. Has the major superior the authority to order the recitation of any prayers in private chapels of his jurisdiction immediately after liturgical functions which do not admit of such prayers; for instance, the conventual Mass or a Missa Cantata?

Resp. 1. Canon 1259, § 1 prescribes that prayers and exercises of piety are not to be permitted in churches or oratories unless they have been reviewed and expressly sanctioned by the local ordinary. The permission here required implies his approval of the *nature* of the prayers and exercises. If these be recognized and approved, the major superior may order their public performance in the churches subject to his jurisdiction. Yet, in as far as these practices in parish churches form part of the *cura animarum*, they are by the same token subject to the local ordinary. The latter's authority in all things touching the care of souls stands supreme. (Canon 1261 § 2; canons 451 § 1 and 631.)

It is precisely this kind of limitation which was stressed by the Sacred Congregation of Rites, 26 April, 1704, when asked if public prayers could be conducted in churches of regulars without the permission of the local ordinary. The Congregation replied affirmatively, indeed, but excepted the holding of processions and the performance of all other acts which by law were disallowed without permission of the local ordinary. (*Decr. Auth.*, No. 2132, ad XV.)

2. Prayers said at the altar after Mass may be permitted or prescribed (S. C. Rites, *Decr. Auth.*, 3157, ad VII), provided the prayers be said with the consent of the ordinary. That the local ordinary is here meant must be necessarily deduced from the fact that the question was submitted by the superior general of a religious society. Whatever authority the major superior may choose to use in this matter must be accommodated to the Church's liturgical laws. He may not set up a prescription contrary to the rubrics.

At the present time no prayers are to be recited publicly after a Missa Cantata or a conventual Mass, even if the latter be celebrated *sine cantu* (*Decr. Auth.*, Nos. 3697, ad VII; 4177, ad II.) For a major superior to prescribe prayers after the manner noted in the question above will mean a lapse from the duty which he has in common with his subjects—the compliance, respect and reverence due the Church's preceptive rules as expressed in her liturgy.

CANON LAW AND THE CONFRATERNITY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

The large increase in the number of Diocesan Directors of the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine during the past year in the United States, has brought certain canonical questions into the foreground. Some of these were discussed at the National Catechetical Congress held at St. Louis last October; a more complete exposition of the position of the Confraternity in the United States will be made at the Fourth National Catechetical Congress to be held at Hartford, Connecticut, 1-4 October, 1938.

The official documents printed below contain the answer to two questions:

1. Are the Confraternities of Christian Doctrine as organized in the United States, even though they do not have formal part in public worship as their scope, aggregated to the Archconfraternity erected in the Church of Our Lady of Tears in Rome?
2. Does the fact that in these Confraternities women are admitted in a directive capacity, prevent them from aggregation to the same Archconfraternity?

The answer to the first question is in the affirmative, and in reply to the second it is made clear that women may be admitted in a directive capacity to the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. In fact, the statutes of the Archconfraternity in Rome are explicit on this point. These replies are of great practical moment, for they insure the canonical erection of many of the Confraternities now existing in the United States, and make certain the right of their members to share in the spiritual privileges granted to the Archconfraternity.

F. A. Walsh,
Director, National Center
Confraternity of Christian Doctrine

10 November, 1937.

APOSTOLIC DELEGATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Most Rev. Edwin V. O'Hara, D.D.
Bishop of Great Falls.

Your Excellency,

I am directed by His Eminence, Julius Cardinal Serafini, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, to inform Your Excellency that the Confraternities of Christian Doctrine as organized in the United States, even though they do not have the *incrementum publici cultus* as their scope, and even though women are admitted in them in a directive capacity, are none the less *de jure* aggregated to the Venerable Archconfraternity of Christian Doctrine canonically erected in Rome. It appears clearly from the Statutes of the Venerable Archconfraternity of Christian Doctrine that its chief purpose is religious instruction and that it admits women as active members. I trust that this information will be of service in meeting the problems which arise in organizing Confraternities.

With sentiments of esteem, and with all good wishes, I remain

Sincerely yours in Christ,
A. G. CICOGNANI
Archbishop of Laodicea
Apostolic Delegate

Rome, 27 October, 1937.

SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE COUNCIL
CATECHETICAL OFFICE. N 861/37

Your Excellency,

After mature examination of all that Your Most Reverend Excellency under dates of 5 and 12 June, 1936, referred to us concerning the manner in which the Confraternities of Christian Doctrine become organized in the United States, I am able to notify you that, even though they do not have as their scope the *incrementum publici cultus* and though they admit women in a directive capacity, they are equally aggregated *de jure* to the Venerable Archconfraternity of Christian Doctrine canonically erected in Rome.

The aforesaid Archconfraternity, erected in fact before the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law with the principal scope of Religious Instruction, also admits women as active members, as Your Excellency can see in the "Constitution of the Venerable Archconfraternity of Christian Doctrine," of which a copy is joined hereto.

Asking Your Excellency when occasion offers to make these things known to Bishop Edwin O'Hara of Great Falls, Chairman of the Episcopal Committee on the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, I express to you my personal esteem.

Fraternally yours,

S. FAGILO, Subsecretary
C. CARD. SERAFINI,
Prefect

To His Excellency
The Most Rev. A. GIOVANNI CICOGNANI,
Titular Archbishop of Laodicea,
Apostolic Delegate, United States of America.

IMPEDIMENT OF DISPARITY OF CULT.

Qu. Last year I "fixed up" two invalid marriages requiring dispensations from the impediment of disparity of cult. The unbaptized parties were Mohammedans. Not realizing, at the time, that Mohammedans as well as Jews are restricted, I did not mention that the parties were Mohammedans. On looking up various authors, I find that controversy rages round the orthodoxy of Jews in the matter of restricting bishops' powers. I could find no such dispute with regard to Mohammedans. The Mohammedans in this locality come from Syria and, although they have no place of worship here, claim to cling to the teachings of the Prophet. What should be done in the matter?

Resp. The matter should be referred to the chancery office. Because both parties are unaware of the invalidity of their marriage, the chancellor will refer the matter to the Holy Office for a *sanatio in radice*.

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLY COMMUNION IN HOSPITALS.

Qu. The December number of the REVIEW has an article on distributing Holy Communion in hospitals. The answer to the question given under No. 1, seems to indicate that it is required to recite certain prayers at each sick-bed over and above the *Corpus Domini* or the *Accipe frater* (*soror*). It would seem that the S. C. R. does not prescribe this. Please refer to the 1936 edition of *The Pastoral Companion* by Anler-Bonzelet, page 22.

Resp. The decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, dated 9 January, 1929, provides that where Holy Communion is to be given to a number of people in different rooms of the same building, all the prayers prescribed in the Ritual for the administration of Holy Communion *extra ecclesiam* need not be repeated in each room or ward. The preliminary prayers are recited only in the first room. In the other rooms only the *Misereatur*, *Indulgentiam*, *Ecce Agnus Dei*, *and Domine non sum dignus* (once only), and in the last room the versicle, response, the prayer *Domine sancte*, and the blessing. Hence in each ward of the hospital, or room in which there are several to receive Holy Communion, at each sick-bed just the *Corpus Domini*, or *Accipe frater* (*soror*) is said, the shortened preliminary prayers being recited as outlined above in each *room*, not at each bed.

TRANSLATION OF "DE SPIRITU SANCTO."

Qu. In revising a translation of prayers, I find two translations of the phrase *de Spiritu Sancto.* In the Apostles Creed, *qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto* is regularly translated, " Who was conceived *by* the Holy Ghost "; the phrase *Et concepit de Spiritu Sancto* of the Angelus is commonly translated "And she conceived *of the Holy Ghost* ". The Raccolta uses " of ". Other texts use " of " or " by " for both the Creed and the Angelus.

Is there any reason for this difference of translation? Is the Raccolta translation " conceived *of* the Holy Ghost " preferable for both the Angelus and the Creed?

Resp. Both translations have high sanction. The use of the word " of," however, seems to be the more reverent.

THE REAL PRESENCE IN PARTICLES OF CONSECRATED HOST.

Qu. I should be glad if you would answer the following questions in the REVIEW:

1. Could a host which has fallen into wine be taken out, dried and validly consecrated?

2. If so, does our Lord's body remain present in particles that remain in a ciborium after the wine has been poured in during the process of purification?

Resp. 1. It is possible that such a host would remain valid matter.

2. " Tamdiu conservatur praesentia Christi sub speciebus quamdiu species *permanent integrae*, ita ut sub eis posset substantia panis vel vini conservari; desinit Christus sub eis esse, quando in eis facta est alteratio seu corruptio sufficiens ad panis vel vini corruptionem, si eis subesset. Cessantibus speciebus panis et vini, desinit ibi esse Corpus et Sanguis Christi et succedit ea substantia quae generata fuisset ex substantia panis et vini si subessent." (*Theol. Moralis*, Aertnys-Damen (1928), tomus II; No. 101.) Since the particles are quite small, it would appear that the species are " corrupted " during the process of purification. Should one of these " corrupted " particles remain in the ciborium and later dry out, our Lord's body would not be present. When the species are corrupted, the Real Presence ceases.

RANKE'S HISTORY OF THE POPES ON INDEX.

Qu. 1. Is Ranke's History of the Popes on the Index of Forbidden Books?

2. If so, does it come under canon 2318?

Resp. 1. The latest edition of the Index (the Italian edition in 1929) still lists this work as forbidden.

2. The absence of the dagger (†) before this title indicates that it was not placed on the Index by an apostolic letter and therefore keeping or reading it does not entail the excommunication inflicted by canon 2318.

DIARIUM ROMANAE CURIAE.

OFFICIAL LIST OF RECENT PONTIFICAL APPOINTMENTS.

Assistants at the Pontifical Throne:

10 December, 1937: His Excellency the Most Rev. Michael Sheehan, titular Archbishop of Germia and Coadjutor to the Archbishop of Sydney, N. S. W., Australia.

11 January, 1938: His Excellency the Most Rev. Alfred Sinnott, Archbishop of Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

Protonotaries Apostolic ad instar participantium:

23 October, 1937: Monsignor James William Stenson, of the Diocese of Omaha.

13 December: Monsignor Daniel Doody, of the Diocese of Syracuse.

3 February, 1938: Monsignor Michael F. Sheehan, of the Diocese of Salt Lake.

Domestic Prelates of His Holiness:

23 October, 1937: Monsignors Edward Joseph Hunkeler and Edward Joseph Flanagan, of the Diocese of Omaha.

24 October: Monsignors Joseph Bosheck, Bernard Henry Lordemann and John Leo Zaplotnik, of the Diocese of Omaha.

14 December: Monsignors Francis A. Thill and Timothy J. Deasy, of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati.

Monsignors John Franklin Mary Hardeman and Francis Dominic Grady, of the Diocese of Nashville.

23 December: Monsignor John Tierney, of the Diocese of Clogher, Ireland.

Monsignor James MacGinley, of the Diocese of Raphee, Ireland.

Monsignors Richard Francis Sullivan and Patrick Lynn, of the Diocese of Middlesbrough, England.

28 December: Monsignors James Irwin and John Cyril Hawes, of the Diocese of Geraldton, Australia.

29 December: Monsignor Daniel O'Hagan, of the Diocese of Dromore, Ireland.

30 December: Monsignor James B. O'Reilly, of the Archdiocese of New York.

4 January, 1938: Monsignors Augustine F. Ravoire, George Andrée, August Joseph Bruening, Charles Paschal Greco, John Martin Eyraud and Celestine M. Chambon, of the Archdiocese of New Orleans.

Monsignor John J. V. Gaudet, of the Archdiocese of Moncton, N. B., Canada.

5 January: Monsignors Joseph Tynan, Eustace Anthony Morrogh-Bernard and John Gabriel Vance, of the Archdiocese of Westminster, England.

31 January: Monsignor William J. Spiegel, of the Diocese of Pittsburgh.

Monsignor Nicholas J. Pinter, of the Archdiocese of San Antonio.

Monsignors Francis W. Walsh and John A. Nageleisen, of the Archdiocese of New York.

The Grand Cross of the Order of Pius:

25 January, 1938: Sir Bernard Arthur William Patrick Hastings Forbes, Earl of Granard, England.

The Grand Cross of the Order of St. Gregory the Great, civil class:

12 December, 1937: Messrs. John Pierpont Morgan and Thomas William Lamont, New York.

Knight Commander of the Order of St. Gregory the Great, civil class:

5 January, 1938: Mr. Henry John Hope, of the Archdiocese of Westminster, England.

Knights of the Order of St. Gregory the Great, civil class:

5 January, 1938: Messrs. Edward Huntly-Gordon, George Elliot-Anstruther and Berthold S. Kittel, of the Archdiocese of Westminster, England.

10 January: Messrs. Thomas F. Walsh, John W. Gleason and Richard Reid, of the Diocese of Savannah-Atlanta.

18 January: Mr. Reginald Eyre-Huddleston, of the Diocese of Northampton, England.

31 January: Professor Romual Piatkowski, of the Archdiocese of Detroit.

The Grand Cross of the Order of St. Sylvester, Pope:

25 January, 1938: Captain Walter Legge, England.

Knight of the Order of St. Sylvester, Pope:

1 February, 1938: Mr. Anthony Francis Sutton, of the Archdiocese of Adelaide, Australia.

Privy Chamberlain Supernumerary of His Holiness:

3 February, 1938: Monsignor Roman R. Atkielski, of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.

Privy Chamberlains of Sword and Cape of His Holiness:

27 January, 1938: Messrs. John T. Smith, Alfred E. Smith and John S. Burke, of the Archdiocese of New York.

Book Reviews

CANONICAL PROCEDURE IN MATRIMONIAL CASES. By William J. Doheny, C.S.C., J.U.D. Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co. 1938. Pp. xxxii + 725.

The Code of Canon Law is to saintly Pius X a " monumentum aere perennius ". Its promulgation revitalized the study of ecclesiastical law, a study that had formerly spelled despair for students because of the mass and maze of conflicting legislation. Positions on diocesan curias emerged from the state of merely honorary distinctions and became vital, practical posts in the efficient running of the diocese. Duties and obligations attaching thereunto were distinctly pointed out by the Code. Knowledge of processual law became vital to the orderly functioning of every tribunal.

Two decades of experience with the new procedure brought out many questions urgently needing solution. Officials sought in vain for answers among the works of canonists. Local curias were left to shift for themselves; details of practice in one diocese often differed sharply from those of a neighboring curia. The Holy See, recognizing this, issued through the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, under date of 15 August 1936, a lengthy supplementary *Instructio* to the procedural canons of the Code regarding matrimonial cases.

A commentary of this *Instructio* comprises the first part of Dr. Doheny's work. Indefatigably the author considers each of the 240 articles in their proper order. The reader is impressed with the clarity of style, the lucidity of explanation, the thoroughness of detail in this work. Every word of every article is considered in its text and context, so that the book becomes a running commentary on the entire *Instructio.* Problems long left undecided are attacked by the author with the skill of a master jurist. With the courageous stride of a pioneer, Dr. Doheny raises and satisfactorily solves difficulties which might, if left to grow, have become formidable in time.

This work is the first commentary to be written on the entire *Instructio.* Every point of formal procedure considered by the *Instructio* has been taken up. The nature of the ecclesiastical tribunals, the duties of each individual official, the procedure of every detail of a case from the introduction of the libel to the definitive sentence—and after that to the sentence of the appellate courts—carry the burden of Part One of this book.

One is pleased with the way questions are answered. The author throws no penumbra over his positions. He metes full credit to opposing opinions, but he always sets forth his reasons for dissent.

Officials of diocesan curias who refuse admission to cases regarding the marriage of two non-Catholics will be surprised at the magnificent way the author vindicates the right to the Promoter of Justice to introduce such cases after due denunciation made to him. All court officers will find splendidly satisfactory the author's treatment of the following points: consorts as culpable causes of the impediment or nullity (pp. 96sqq.); the value of judicial depositions of the consorts (pp. 213 sqq.); the place played by presumptions of law in rendering decisions (pp. 288 sqq.); and the procedure in incidental causes and interlocutory sentences (pp. 312 sqq.)

Part Two of Dr. Doheny's book is an application of the processual law to practical cases. Here the author attempts and successfully accomplishes a thorough commentary on the canon law of impediments to marriage. In the First Part of his work the author reveals his acquaintance with the procedure of the Holy Roman Rota; in this part he manifests his thorough knowledge of Rotal jurisprudence. Each impediment is amply explained, pertinent decisions of the Rota are summarized and practical suggestions for adjudication of cases are given. Synoptic lists of Rotal decisions are appended to the commentary on each impediment, constituting a veritable mine of jurisprudence for advocates, defenders of the bond and judges to explore.

The treatment of the impediment of impotence, of ligamen arising from a common-law marriage, of insanity and of error as invalidating factors to marriage merits special mention. The author's contention that the omission of the Catholic party's *cautio* in disparate marriages nullifies marriage before as well as after the promulgation of the Code, will be amazing to many, but it is founded on solid jurisprudence.

It is hard to see how any canonist will be able to do without Dr. Doheny's work. It augurs well to be the authoritative book for American tribunals. Its format is pleasing, and it is enhanced by a complete index. It has gotten away from the musty style of legal commentaries; it is vital, instructive, casuistic. We are inclined to believe that Dr. Doheny has made for himself, too, a lasting monument to his scholarship.

PIERS PLOWMAN: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE A-TEXT. By T. P. Dunning, C.M., M.A. Dublin: The Talbot Press, Ltd. 1937. Pp. ix+214.

The question of authorship of the fourteenth-century English *Piers Ploman* poem, first seriously broached by Professor J. M. Manly in the May, 1906, number of *Modern Philology* and given wide currency in the chapter on *"Piers Plowman" and its Sequence,* allotted to him for treatment in the second volume of *The Cambridge History of*

English Literature (1908) thrusts its disturbing head, somewhat unnecessarily, at us again in the excellent *fontes interpretationis* monograph of Father T. P. Dunning, C.M., of St. Joseph's College, Blackrock, Ireland. At first vigorously oppugnated and repudiated, the theory of multiple authorship of the poem has within the last two decades gained more extended acceptance, and is now dissented from in a spirit of admonitory caution rather than just categorically denied, R. W. Chambers and J. H. G. Grattan, for their part, constantly maintaining that judgment be withheld until more accurate textual evidence is forthcoming.

These are problems and difficulties for the special student of the medieval poem. Father Dunning is, after all, primarily concerned with that part of the long work which even in the MSS. generally is designated *Visio de Petro Plowman*. Is his recurrent pre-occupation with the *Vita de Dowel, Dobet and Dobest* (Chapter III, 20 pages) and the brief comparison of the literary merits of the A- and B-texts (Chapter IV, 12 pages) but an *überbleibsel* of degree demands of the National University of Ireland to which the study was submitted as an M.A. thesis?

The real heart of Father Dunning's book, sound in scholarship and thorough in treatment, is the interpretation of the poem in Chap. II (some 140 pages) on the basis of the *Fontes Interpretationis* he succinctly indicates in Chapter I (12 pages). These *fontes* are found in " the Fathers of the Church, in particular in the two chief Latin Fathers, St. Augustine and St. Gregory " (p. 14), in the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas (*ibid*) and in the " continuity in XIVth century England of the Patristic teaching on the subject matter of the poem ", instanced chiefly by " quotation from writers contemporary with Langland, chiefly from Archbishop Thoresby's Catechism (written in 1357), from the works of Richard Rolle of Hampole (died 1349), and above all from the sermon literature of the period 1350-1450, as quoted by Dr. Owst (pp. 14-15). Owst's two excellent volumes, *Preaching in Medieval England* and *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, are naturally drawn on, since the sermonic remains of the period lies all but unavailable still in MSS. form. Father Dunning implies in the phrases just given, of course, what Dr. Owst perhaps more pertinently expresses (quoted on pp. 9-10) that the " tone of thought " in *Piers Plowman* is " indeed a perfect echo of the Church's message to the world." This idea—the discovery in medieval writings of the common, universal and everyday teachings of Catholic dogma and morals, all down through the Middle Ages and enduring into the present—is at once an evidence of the oneness and unchangeableness of the Church's teachings to men of all races and times and the recognition of a canon of literary interpretative criticism that permits a juster evaluation than was possible even down to the 29th century of vernacular literary remains of an age of Christian Faith rather far removed from the doubt or disbelief of the present. The critical formula just enunciated is certainly better adapted to reveal the Middle Ages than the methodology largely in vogue to almost the present generation of living writers of annotating and interpreting medieval texts by two specific and widely-separated references to individual authors, be they Patristic or other; the secret of fuller understanding has correctly been found in the realization of a common heritage of a Catholic Christian world philosophy and a common tradition of Catholic Christian cultural integrity. It is only fair to state, of course, that Father Dunning has just this in mind and expresses it himself in *passim* references throughout his book, as for instance in the opening sentence of chapter II: " In treating of human activity in terms of man's final end, Langland (*It is assumed of course that such is the author's name*) will be making use of the positive dogmatic system promulgated by the Church and accepted by the consciences of the faithful."

Father Dunning, in Chapters I and II, has done a piece of work meritorious for English literary scholarship and not of mean service to Catholic history and apologetics. His interpretation, too, is so cleverly bound up with an episode-to-episode treatment of the Vision of the A-text that it might well become too ready a substitute for a first-hand acquaintance with the poem itself, whether in the quaint dialectic popular English of the fourteenth century or such excellent modern englishings as the Sheed and Ward volume, *The Vision of Piers Plowman*, by H. W. Wells. That, however, can only be a *felix culpa* in a little book that must needs fulfill its destiny in opening up to many a reader an important and great literary reproduction of the past and whet his appetite for more of the poem and more of the age.

ST. PETER. By Francis Underhill. New York, Longmans Green & Co. 1938. Pp. viii + 248.

The Anglican Bishop of Bath and Wells here presents a very praiseworthy study of the Prince of the Apostles with announced purpose of examining the method employed by Christ in training St. Peter to be the first leader of the so-called " Primitive Church." To the very scant scriptural sources he adds the more extensive tradition, or " legend " as it is here designated. In general a conservative position is taken upon the disputed points in St. Peter's career. There is clear admission of his primacy among the Apostles, as founded upon the special consideration he receives from Christ. Nor is there any countenance given to the radical view which opposes the clear evidence that St. Peter journeyed to Rome and there suffered martyrdom " where now stands the greatest church of the Christian faith, St. Peter's in Rome. . . . We may be as reasonably sure as we can be of anything of this knd that there under the vast dome of St. Peter's Church still lies the body of the fisherman of the Galilean lake, the friend of Jesus Christ, the Prince of the Apostolic band." This will indicate the general temper of the volume.

But the writer of course rejects the position of the Roman Catholic Church to be " the only Christian and Catholic Church, all other Christian bodies being in heresy and schism and therefore excommunicate ". He really does not examine the claim in all its strength, though he does admit in all fairness that it is not founded exclusively upon the much controverted passage in the sixteenth chapter of Matthew. A full inquiry would undoubtedly produce most disconcerting consequences for him. Yet it may be suggested that there could hardly be anything else in a study of St. Peter that could compare with this question in its importance for the student of the saint. Practically everything that the Bishop of Bath and Wells does choose to discuss should logically lead him to the Roman Catholic position. The abrupt refusal to go the whole way that all the facts and tradition indicate, must evidently be due to some other direction than the clear light of reason and historical events. Yet this will not detract fundamentally from the value of this interesting study for the Catholic as well as the non-Catholic reader. It is a good indication of how far back toward the Roman Catholic position careful scholarship outside the Church has moved.

A VALIANT BISHOP AGAINST A RUTHLESS KING. By Paul McCann. B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, Mo. 1938. Pp. x + 277.

Somewhat eclipsed by the more spectacular figures of the Reformation, Saint John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, has been too little known in English and ecclesiastical history. Indeed, there are those who see in him a truer type of ante-Reformation English Catholicism than even in the great Lord Chancellor, Sir Thomas More. To this reviewer, John Fisher occupies a place with Thomas of Canterbury, and this with full recognition of the heroic virtues of Saint Thomas More. But somehow the saint of Rochester is more typically English than any martyr of Henrican days. There was a quiet constancy about him that inevitably led him to the gallows; this was the usual English way of answering rulers who robbed England of the Faith. Hence in knowing Bishop Fisher one comes closer to a better understanding of what happened under Henry VIII. It was no spectacular change, but only the almost imperceptible slipping into dangerous waters that eventually would carry the whole nation into heresy and separation from the Church. Paul McCann's *Valiant Bishop* is a worth-while contribution to a fuller knowledge of this change.

The book is more than a biography, however, for it is a splendid pen-picture of the sixteenth-century affairs. In England, Wolsey and Colet were undermining the Faith, while Henry was laying the foundation of the disaster which would finally descend upon the country when Elizabeth came to power. Across the Channel, Luther was ranging Germany into two hostile camps; even Charles V and France were battling when both should have been concerned with the Turk. The papacy itself seemed powerless to correct the abuses that had been perpetrated against the Bride of Christ.

All this was happening while John Fisher was Chancellor of Cambridge and Privy Councillor of the King. Consequently his defiance of Henry was something that rocked England to its depths. It should not have been surprising, however, because his opposition to Luther had something about it that Henry's lacked. His was a defence that would ultimately claim his life.

There is more to this biography of Fisher, however, than a mere portrayal of the great public figure which he was. In it we see a man of battle preaching peace, a university chancellor, while building up the prestige of Cambridge, feeding the hungry and clothing the poor; a man who talked sanctity and lived it too; one who stood alone in loneliness, faithful among the faithless, until he received the martyr's crown. It is a book that can be recommended for many reasons. In format it is attractive, with its twenty-five interesting illustrations and appendix of adequate length. But it would have been well if the author had given some indication of the sources he used.

SEX PSYCHOLOGY IN EDUCATION. By Rudolph Allers. Translated by Sidney A. Raemers, Ph.D. B. Herder Book Co. Pp. 279.

Dr. Allers is one of the most able of the Catholic psychologists. Fortunately he has escaped the present difficulties that beset his native Austria and is now a member of the faculty of the Catholic University of America. The subject upon which he writes is important and timely and his present book should be of the greatest help to Catholic clergy and educators. Carefully and fairly it evaluates the present problem of sex education upon which so much that is purely drivel is spoken and written. To attempt to present properly this subject and afford all sides a hearing is an heroic task, but this Dr.

Allers does with the same clarity and depth of thought that characterize his other works.

The early chapters of the book are given over to the development of his thesis. As the reader proceeds he is amply repaid for his attention to these details. In the fourth chapter, " The Psychology of Sex Life ", he discusses sex in the various stages of an individual life. The various subdivisions such as virtue and purity, purity and personality, modesty, etc., are interesting and enlightening. He also discusses autoeroticism, sexual perversions and many of the problems which arise in society in general and which create such a problem. To quote: " A youth who is losing or has already lost his self-respect and his courage and who dares not offer resistance comes more and more to doubt his ability to find a place in life. This mental condition along with the awakening of the sexual urge may easily cause him to fall into autoeroticism. The foregoing statement is verified in many concrete instances." The author's psychiatric practice and psychological knowledge furnish him with many cases in point. There is no doubt but that many of the habitual sexual offenders are sick rather than simply pernicious.

The book is replete with discussions of many parts and angles of the same subject, namely the place of sex and sex teaching in present day education or in education in any day for that matter. It is a subject on which little or nothing is written which is readily available for the average Catholic educator or teacher. The difficult subject is treated scientifically and reverently, and the author's deep faith and scientific acumen are evident throughout the book, and so the book can be recommended to clergy and laity alike. Here and there the translation will be found a little too literal, but in general the volume is excellent.

ONTOLOGY. A Class Manual in Fundamental Metaphysics. By Paul J. Glenn. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co. 1937. Pp. vii+340.

THEODICY. A Class Manual in the Philosophy of the Deity. By Paul J. Glenn. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co. 1938. Pp. vii+300.

To his list of manuals in Scholastic philosophy which already include volumes on dialectics, criteriology, psychology, ethics and history of philosophy, Dr. Glenn now adds his studies of being from the metaphysical standpoint. These latest treatises are marked by the same severe simplicity, clarity and exact logical order that have characterized all their predecessors from this author's pen. Such characteristics are quite obviously the result of the clearest possible conception of the field as a whole as that of its detailed parts, and the close adherence to the constantly announced plan that is conceived for the presentation of the subject. These are invaluable in elementary text books for beginners who must lean heavily upon such a skeleton of thought for the filling out of their understanding. Multitudinous footnotes are not found, presumably because they would be concerned with more abstruse controversial points which would be distracting to the beginner.

If the author has not made any concession to style following his Scholastic models, he has spared no effort to be exact in his meaning. In a word, the Latin manuals of an earlier day have here become available without loss of ideas to the layman who is not versed in the older language of philosophy. It would not be at all difficult for a layman of average intelligence, and even without a teacher, to read Father Glenn's whole series carefully by himself. Upon accomplishing that task he would be in possession of the essential features of Scholastic philosophy.

Without actually quoting St. Thomas, the author adheres closely to the Thomistic viewpoint. Evidently he does not agree with a recent Scholastic writer in the field of metaphysics whose book extensively quotes St. Thomas in the belief that an elementary text has for its primary purpose to send the student to the recognized sources of Scholastic thought. In this day when the demand is for a return to such sources as being far more stimulating than their commentaries, one may imagine Dr. Glenn's volumes receiving severe criticism. On the pragmatic test of their actual successful use in classes of various types however we have found most of them very satisfactory.

PRIEST AND PENITENT. A Discussion of Confession. By the Reverend John Carmel Heenan, D.D. Sheed and Ward, New York City. 1937. Pp. x+194.

The purpose of this treatment of the Sacrament of Penance is twofold: first, to help break down prejudice by giving non-Catholics a better understanding of confession, which more than anything else is an obstacle to conversion, and secondly to make confession easier for Catholics, many of whom regard it as a necessary ordeal. To the achievement of these purposes the book adds the further advantage that it provides excellent material upon which the confessor might well examine himself to see how he measures up to the standards the author takes for granted.

Dr. Heenan tries to avoid the appearance of scholarship and profound theological knowledge. In this attempt he is not altogether successful. He gives evidence of thorough familiarity with the history of Penance and with the moral principles underlying it, especially in his explanation of the place occupied by Penance in the economy of salvation, and particularly in the sacramental system. It is to be regretted that he does not present a more complete and logical treatment of the qualities of contrition. Many Catholics unfortunately are lacking in this necessary knowledge. Perhaps the most valuable chapter is the one in which he describes the attitude of the confessor. The thing best calculated to remove fear is to look at confession through the eyes of the confessor. The personal element which seems so real and so important to the penitent will disappear when he realizes that from the point of view of the confessor he is just one of many and that his failings do not differ greatly from those of the others who seek the peace and tranquility that sacerdotal absolution imparts to souls. No effort is made to propose an exhaustive catalogue of sins, the author preferring to regard the table of sins from an apologetic standpoint, and to lay down practical hints not likely to be found in other books that come readily to the hand of lay people.

While the unity of purpose and the fact that the author treats everything under the same *ratio formalis* gives a certain coherence to the book, the style is sometimes lacking in smoothness, and the transitions are somewhat abrupt owing to the multitude and diversity of the subjects discussed. The book is to be commended for the practical helps it brings to penitents and priests alike.

Book Notes

In this day of the digest and the tabloid, the religious pamphlet fulfills a distinct need. It presents the vital but often neglected truths of religion in a form that appeals to minds accustomed to swift and sketchy reading. This is what Dr. Connell does with regard to the sacraments. In a series of seven attractive pamphlets he gives a clear, simple exposition of the Catholic doctrine on these foundations of divine grace. Within the space of thirty-two pages the explanation of each sacrament is surprisingly complete. These pamphlets will enable the layman to understand what the sacraments really are and how they permeate the whole Christian life from our birth in Christ to our passage into eternity. A well-planned study outline at the end of each pamphlet makes the entire series especially valuable to study clubs. The pamphlets may also be read with profit by seminarians in connexion with their theological studies. To priests they offer helpful guidance in preparing sermons and instructions. In fact, one has here an excellent basis for a complete course of sermons on the sacraments. (*The Seven Sacraments* (Pamphlets), by the Rev. Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., S.T.D. International Catholic Truth Society, 407 Bergen St., Brooklyn, N. Y., (each 32 pages, 10c.)

Maisie Ward's *The Oxford Groups* (Sheed & Ward, London, 1937, 44 pp.) carries with it the double recommendation of the author's good judgment, well known to readers of her other books, and of the fact that she writes from personal experience as well as study of the Group. While fully aware of the possible dangers in some of the Group's activities, she sees in the movement a decided advance over the old-fashioned Protestant closed mind: it presents, she says, to Catholics a challenge and an opportunity to unfold to Mr. Buchman's disciples the riches of Catholic spirituality, beside which the Group's outlook, however earnest, seems " one-dimensional ".

The second series of Father Timothée Richard's *Théologie et Pieté* has the same happy combination of doctrine and practice that distinguished the first volume. The knowledge of oneself, venial sin, perfection, good influence, true generosity and respect are the principal chapter headings of this latest volume. Following the doctrine of St. Thomas, Father Richard presents another work that students of the spiritual life cannot afford to ignore. (Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1937. Pp. vi + 282.)

Longmans, Green & Co. has just issued two little gift books that will delight children between five and eight years of age. One is *Little Saint Agnes* by Helen Homan, with pictures by a Religious of the Congregation of Mary; the second is *A Little Patron of Gardeners*, a life of St. Fiacre, by Catherine Beebe and illustrated by Robb Beebe. The print is large for little eyes, the words not too " hard ", and the stories skillfully told. (New York. 1938. Pp. 40 each.)

A Light Shining by S. M. Johnston (New York, Benziger Brothers, pp. xii + 415) sets forth the life and letters of Mother Mary Joseph Dallmer, Ursuline nun of Galveston, Texas. While the book considers principally the personal history of Mother Mary Joseph, there are many interesting sidelights on the history of Catholic education in Texas. While some of the items are quite inconsequential, or merely of local interest, the broad human sympathies, the freshness and unspoiled naturalness of the " heroine " should guarantee the book a wide circulation.

Dr. Michael J. O'Brien, whose studies on the Irish in early American history are so well known, has recently placed on the market *Hercules Mulligan* (pp. 190) and *George Washington's Associations with the Irish* (pp. 271). Dr. O'Brien's interest is in Irishmen who were prominent in the early history of the nation, and in his notes he says little of their religion. He does, however, explode the " Scotch-Irish " myth, and those who are interested primarily in the Catholics of eighteenth century America will find much of interest in his pages. There is a deal of repetition in the books and the tone is one of aggressive apology. The author has done some fine research work, and both books are thoroughly documented. Those writing or speaking about the Irish in America will need these two books. (New York, P. J. Kenedy & Sons.)

The third tome of *Joannis A Sancto Thoma Cursus Theologici* (Tornaci, Belgium, Desclée & Co. Pp. vi + 608) is ready for distribution. This volume, which discusses the omnipotence of God, the will of God and predestination, brings to a close the tract *De Deo Uno.* The book is splendidly printed on fine paper. It is a "must" for seminary libraries, and advanced students in theology will want it on their shelves. It is quite in accord with the volumes that have gone before.

The second edition of *Outline Meditations on the Passion*, by the Rev. Michael Browne, S.J. (Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son, pp. 64), arrives too late for pre-Lenten mention. But it is a pamphlet that will be welcome at any season of the year. In addition to the outline course, Father Browne gives a Paraphrase of the Our Father, a short colloquy before the crucifix and with Christ crucified, a translation of the prayer of St. Francis Xavier, and a "Way of the Cross". The pamphlet was first published anonymously in 1917 and has been long out of print. Consisting principally of texts from the Old and New Testament, priests will find the *Outline* helpful in the preparation of sermons.

Dr. Edwin Kaiser's translation of Joseph Lorix's *History of the Church* (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., pp. xvi + 573) makes available for English-speaking readers an excellent compendium of church history. It is written from the European point of view, however, and the Church in the United States is dismissed in one paragraph.

Instead of stressing political aspects which affected the Church, the author shows how her progress has been influenced by the "ideas and culture" about her. The book is divided into three "ages", Greco-Roman Age, German-Roman Age, Age of Nationalism. The "Age of Nationalism", from about 1450 to the present time, is subdivided into the age accepting revelation and the age hostile to revelation. The final period (from Napoleon I to 1929) is considered as the "Centralized Church in Conflict with Unbelieving Modern Culture".

Although the book is written primarily for Germans, Dr. Kaiser has done well to make it available to those who do not read German.

Articles that appeared in the REVIEW during 1937 led Father John J. Wynne to compile his *Priest and People Cooperate in Holy Mass.* (New York, The Home Press, pp. 61.) The purpose of the pamphlet is to help the laity know what the Mass is and to take their part in it. Taking the Mass for the Feast of the Holy Name of Jesus, Father Wynne presents an English translation of the entire Mass on alternate pages. On the pages facing the prayers of the Mass is placed a short but complete explanation of the rubrics and actions of the priest. Father Wynne is thorough, and the pamphlet is likely to prove very popular. A "word-book" of a dozen pages giving an explanation of terms used in the Mass or connected with it, is a helpful addition.

Number 13 of the Philosophical Series, *Textus et Documenta* is *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Tractatus De Spiritualibus Creaturis.* The editor, Leo W. Keeler, S.J., died last September. Editing the text with the aid of the codices of the Vatican Library, revising and completing various references of sixteenth-century editors, and supplying many original notes, Father Keeler turned out a volume that is on a par in scholarship and interest with the preceeding works of the series. (Rome, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana. 1937; pp xv + 149.)

What is Christianity? Is it recognizable? Is it definable? There are too many to-day throughout the world who have persuaded themselves that it is impossible to answer these questions. P. R. Bernard, in the latest addition to the *Collection Dominicaine, La Vie Spirituelle* answers them well, clearly and completely. Those who read French at all will find little difficulty with the style, and will find the reading well worth while. (Entretiens sur L'Essence du Christianisme. Pp. 289. Bruges, Belgium: Desclée, De Brouwer & Cie.)

The Mystery of Sacrifice (A Meditation on the Liturgy, by Evelyn Underhill, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., pp. xx + 75) seeks to penetrate the inner meaning of the Eucharistic Sacrifice from the devotional viewpoint of the High Anglican. The writer is already known for the more than a dozen works in the field of mysticism that have issued from her pen. While the Anglican Prayer Book is her general source, she does not hesitate to use the Roman Missal and the various Eastern liturgies. The five moments she selects as necessary phases of "the rhythm of sacrifice," the Preparation, the Offertory, Intercession, Consecration, and Communion, be it noted, are simply means by which man draws near to God and passes through phases of interior life. Apparently everything is here save that one clear reality without which these others have no life, namely the Real Presence of God made man. His Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity. Speaking of mysteries, one of the greatest mysteries is how this writer, and many in her class, can think even slightly on the import of the Roman and Eastern liturgies from which she quotes, without seeing the futility of the shadow without the substance. The sad tragedy of the sixteenth-century attack upon this central doctrine of all Christianity still claims its multitude of victims who seem to yearn instinctively for that very Presence and yet are condemned by their system to remain in the vague shadows of a futile mysticism.

Books Received

THEOLOGICAL AND DEVOTIONAL.

ADDRESSES AND SERMONS. By His Excellency, the Most Reverend Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. Benziger Brothers, New York City. Foreword by the Most Reverend Edward Mooney, D.D. 1938. Pp. ix + 348. Price, $2.50 *net*.

LA CROIX ET L'AUTEL. Le Sacrifice de Jésus et de son Corps Mystique. Par l'abbé Louis Soubigou, professeur d'Ecriture Sainte au grand séminaire de Quimper. P. Lethielleux, Paris, France. 1938. Pp. 118. Prix, 10 fr.

LA VIE MERVEILLEUSE DE MOÏSE. Par Aloys Miramar (Abbé Renou), Lauréat de l'Académie française. Préface du R. P. Spicq, O.P., Professeur d'Ecriture Sainte au Saulchoir. P. Lethielleux, Paris, France. 1938. Pp. 192. Illustré de 140 dessins. Prix, 20 fr.

COMMENTARIUS IN SUMMAM D. THOMAE. De Gratia De Sacramentis in Communi. Opus conscripsit Augustus Ferland, p. s. s., in Sacra Theologia et Philosophia Doctor, Academiae Canadensis S. Thomae Aquinatis Sodalis, in Universitate Montis Regii Professor. Praefationem confecit Eminentissimus J. M. Rodericus Cardinalis Villeneuve, O.M.I., Archiepiscopus Quebecensis. Grand Seminaire, Montreal, Canada. 1938. Pp. xxi + 509.

THE DEVOTIONS IN HONOR OF THE THREE HOURS' AGONY. Saint Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N. J. 1938. Pp. 78. Price, 10c.

SEVEN SWORDS. Considerations on the Seven Great Sorrows of our Blessed Lady. By the Reverend Hugh F. Blunt, LL.D. P. J. Kenedy & Sons, New York City. 1938. Pp. 111. Price, $1.00.

THE RELIGION TEACHER'S LIBRARY. A Selected Annotated List of Books, Pamphlets and Magazines. Compiled by the Reverend Felix M. Kirsch, O.M.Cap., Ph.D., Litt.D., and the Reverend Claude Vogel, O.M.Cap., Ph.D. Saint Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, New Jersey. 1938. Pp. v + 57. Price, 25c.

DISCOURSES ON THE APOSTLES' CREED. By the Reverend Clement H. Crock. Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., New York City. 1938. Pp. xi + 289. Price, $2.75.

MÉDITATIONS POUR RELIGIEUSES. Brefs Sujets pour Chaque Jour. Par le R. P. Raoul Plus, S.J. Apostolat de la Prière, Toulouse. 1938. Pp. 423. Prix, 15 fr.

JOANNIS A SANCTO THOMA O.P. CURSUS THEOLOGICI. Tomus III: Opera et Studio Monachorum quorumdam Solesmensium O.S.B. editus, in quo quid contineatur versa Pagella indicabit. Tornaci, Belgium. Desclee & Cie. 1937. Pp. vi + 608. Pretium, Belgas 42 fr.

REPERTORIUM JURIDICUM ECCLESIASTICUM seu Curiae Romanae iurisprudentia universa, post editum Codicem iuris canonici (1918-1931) publici iuris facta, cum canonum ac rerum omnium Indicibus locupletissimis. Editio altera diligenter recognita et aucta. Jus Pontificum, Rome. 1937. Pp. 92. Prezzo, Lib. It. 16.

CONFIRMATION IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Matthias Laros. Translated by George Sayer. Sheed & Ward, New York City. 1938. Pp. vii + 229. Price, $2.00.

CANONICAL PROCEDURE IN MATRIMONIAL CASES. By the Reverend William J. Doheny, C.S.C., J.U.D., Advocate and Procurator of the Tribunal of the Signatura Apostolica and of the Sacred Roman Rota. Preface by the Most Reverend Filippi Bernardini, D.D., S.T.D., J.U.D., Titular Archbishop of Antioch in Pisidia. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 1938. Pp. xxxii + 725. Price, $8.00.

JEAN BERCHMANS. Par le R. P. Tony Severin, S.J. L'Edition Universelle, S.A. Bruxelles, Belgium. 1938. Pp. 64. Prix, 5 francs.

HOMILETISCHES HANDBUCH. Von Anton Koch, S.J. Erste Abteilung: Homiletisches Quellenwerk. Stoffquellen für Predigt und christliche Unterweisung in 4 Banden, dazu Erganzungsband: Angewandte Homiletik. Erster Band: Erster Teil, Die Lehre von Gott; Zweiter Teil, Die Lehre vom Gottmensch Jesus Christus. B. Herder Book Company, Saint Louis, Missouri. 1937. Pp. xi + 488. Price, $4.75.

BREVIARY OF PIETY FOR CLERICS. The Fourth Edition of the All Hallows Manual, revised and enlarged. Browne & Nolan, Ltd., Dublin, Ireland. 1938. Pp. x + 517. Price, 4/-

OUTLINE MEDITATIONS ON THE PASSION. By the Reverend Michael Browne, S.J. M. H. Gill & Son, Ltd., Dublin, Ireland. 1938. Pp. 64. Price, 8d.

THE PRAYERS OF THE MISSAL. II: The Offertory Prayers and the Post-Communions. By the Reverend C. C. Martindale, S.J., Sheed & Ward, New York City. 1938. Pp. 113. Price, $1.00.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

COMMUNISM AND ANTI-RELIGION. By J. De Bivort de la Saudee. Translated by Reginald J. Dingle. Preface by Count Carton De Wiart. P. J. Kenedy & Son, New York City. 1938. Pp. xv + 119. Price, $1.35.

NATURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. By Geoffrey O'Connell, Ph.D. Preface by Louis J. A. Mercier, A.M., Litt.D., K. L. H. Benziger Brothers, New York City. 1938. Pp. xxvi + 285. Price, $2.75 *net*.

LA PHILOSOPHIE DE LÉON BRUNSCHVICG. Par le R. P. J. Messaut, O.P., Docteur en Théologie. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, France. 1938. Pp. 169.

AMERICAN OR COMMUNIST? You can't be both. By the Reverend William J. Smith, S.J. International Catholic Truth Society, Brooklyn, N. Y. 1938. Pp. 31. Price, 5c.

SOCIAL IDEALS OF SAINT FRANCIS. By the Reverend James Meyer, O.F.M. B. Herder Book Company, Saint Louis, Missouri. 1938. Pp. 128. Price, $1.25; Paper, $0.60.

ENTRETIENS SUR L'ESSENCE DU CHRISTIANISME. Par le R. P. Bernard, O.P. Desclée de Brouwer et Cie., Paris, France. 1938. Pp. 289. Prix, 18 fr.

LEBEN SPRICHT ZU LEBEN. Wirklichkeitsbilder aus dem Alltag der Frau. Von Doctor Gertrud Ehrle. B. Herder Book Company, Saint Louis, Missouri. 1937. Pp. vi + 238. Price, $1.75.

SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS TRACTATUS DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS. Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Series Philosophica 13. Editio critica, Leo W. Keeler, S.J. Apud Pont. Universitatis Gregorianae, Romae, Italy. 1937. Pp. xv + 148.

LES PRINCIPLES DE LA VIE SPIRITUELLE. Par le R. P. Jos. Schrijvers, C.SS.R. l'Edition Universelle, S.A., Bruxelles, Belgium. 1938. Pp. 510. Prix,

THE DOCTRINES OF THE MODERNISTS (The Encyclical *Pascendi* of Pope Pius X), *and Modernist Errors* (The Decree *Lamentabili* of July 4, 1907). Preface by the Reverend Lewis Watt, S.J. The Catholic Truth Society, London, England. 1938. Pp. 77. Price, Ninepence.

HISTORICAL.

JUS CONCORDATARIUM POSTBELLICUM CONLATUM CUM CODICE IURIS CANONICI. Auctore P. Alberto Blat, O.P., Iuris Can. Doctore et Mag. Sacrae Theol. Apud "Angelicum", Rome, Italy. 1938. Pp. 160. Prezzo, Lib. It. 14.

THE OXFORD GROUPS. By Maisie Ward. Sheed & Ward, New York City. 1938. Pp. 44. Price, $0.50.

DER AUSSÄTZIGE. Pater Damian de Neuster auf Hawai. Von Rolf Fechter. B. Herder Book Company, Saint Louis, Missouri. 1937. Pp. vi + 167. Price, $1.15.

UNSERE KIRCHE IM KOMMEN. Begegnung von Jetztzeit und Endzeit. Von Doctor Georg Feuerer. B. Herder Book Company, Saint Louis, Missouri. 1937. Pp. vi + 228. Price, $1.90.

CATHOLICISM IN ENGLAND, 1535-1935. Portrait of a Minority: its Culture and Tradition. By David Mathew. Longmans, Green & Company, New York City. 1937. Pp. xii + 304. Price, 6/-

THE CHURCH IN UNITED STATES HISTORY. America's Debt to Catholics. Adapted with the Author's Permission by F. A. Fink. Our Sunday Visitor Press, Huntington, Indiana. 1938. Pp. 222. Price, 60 cents.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Pope in the World Today. By the Reverend Daniel A. Lord, S.J. Pp. 48. *The Invincible Standard.* By the Reverend Daniel A. Lord, S.J. Pp. 31. *Why are Jews Persecuted?* By the Reverend Joseph N. Moody, Ph.D. Pp. 31. The Queen's Work, Saint Louis, Missouri, 1938. Price, 10c. each.

SONGS OF IMMOLATION. By Sister Marie Emmanuel, S.C. Foreword by the Reverend William A. Scullen, D.D. Benziger Brothers, New York City. 1938. Pp. 82. Price, $1.25.

MY SPANISH ADVENTURE. By John Sheahan Connolley. The Social Forum Press, Toronto, Canada. 1938. Pp. 52. Price, 10c.

Some Spiritual Problems of College Students. By the Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy, Ph.D. 1938. Pp. 37. Price, 15c. postpaid. *God and Governments.* By the Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, S.J. 1938. Pp. 39. Price, 15c. postpaid. *Saints vs. Kings.* By the Reverend James M. Gillis, C.S.P. 1938. Pp. 83. Price, 25c. postpaid. Addresses delivered in the Catholic Hour, produced by the National Council of Catholic Men through the courtesy of the National Broadcasting Company and its associated stations. Our Sunday Visitor Press, Huntington, Indiana.

THE CATHOLIC STAGE IN SPRINGTIME. Practical Stage Work Booklet Series, Number 2. The Catholic Dramatic Movement, Rev. M. Helfen, Oconomowoc, Wisconsin. Pp. 15.